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WHAT IS THE CORRECT STANDARD OF
PRUDENCE IN EMPLOYER STOCK CASES?
JOSE MARTIN JARA*

I. INTRODUCTION

A decade after the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, the
headlines were flooded with the collapse of companies like Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers due to the subprime mortgage
crisis.' After this latest economic crisis, the continued investment
in common stock via a retirement plan may be considered risky for
purposes of achieving a suitable retirement; however, this is not
necessarily true. Common stock can arguably be a prudent
investment within the overall investment portfolio of a retirement
plan. In reality, common stock often fluctuates in value, so a drop
in the stock price over a period of time should not be the basis of a
lawsuit claiming the stock was an imprudent investment. Many
prudent investors purchase stock that fluctuates, but becomes
profitable in the long run. 2 As the great investor Warren Buffet

* Jos6 Martin Jara is a Managing Director in the New York office of SNR
Denton US LLP. He advises clients with respect to their activities in
transactional and regulatory matters and the application of ERISA's fiduciary
standards and prohibited transaction provisions. He routinely represents
clients before the U.S. Department of Labor's Employee Benefits Security
Administration where he was formerly a Senior Pension Law Specialist and
Investigator. He received his BS from Manhattan College, JD from the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and LLM and Employee Benefits Law
Certificate from the Georgetown University Law Center. The author would
like to thank Jordan Mamorsky (a Yale University postdoctoral fellow) for
assisting in the preparation of certain sections of this Article and the editors
and staff of The John Marshall Law Review for their help in publishing this
article.
1. Carrick Mollenkamp, Susanne Craig, Serena NG, & Aaron Lucchetti,
Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG Seeks Cash, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 16, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122145492097035549.html.
2. Table: Returns of Corporate DC Plans with Large Investments in
Company Stock,
PENSION AND
INVESTMENTS
(July 12,
2010),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20100712/chartOl/100709908.Company stock
returns of corporate defined contribution plans with large investments in
company stock vs. the S & P 500. Total returns through June 30, 2010; returns
for periods of more than one year annualized.
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once said, "In the 20th century, the United States endured two
world wars and other traumatic and expensive military conflicts;
the Depression; a dozen or so recessions and financial panics; oil
shocks; a flu epidemic; and the resignation of a disgraced
president. Yet the Dow rose from 66 to 11,497."3 Accordingly,
investment in common stock can be judged on a uniform basis in
accordance with a well-crafted retirement portfolio and can
ultimately be deemed a prudent investment.
Yet, with the stock market crisis of 2008, many companies
that provide pension plans with an option to invest in employer
stock have been the subject of lawsuits claiming violations of the
fiduciary provisions under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Many cases have involved
companies on the verge of bankruptcy, causing employer stock to
become worthless. 4 Nonetheless, even after a decade of the billiondollar losses in retirement savings by participants in the more
publicized cases of the Enron, WorldCom and Global Crossing,
participants are still investing a considerable percentage of their
retirement account balances in employer stock today.5
Over the years, given the subprime mortgage crisis, scandals
such as those involving Enron and Bernie Madoff, the
unprecedented government bailout, and the international
economic crises, many participants in 401(k) plans have seen the
value of their account balances drop dramatically in their
Company

1-year return

3-year return

5-year return

General
Electric
Caterpillar
Target
Occidental
Petroleum
Coca-Cola
Johnson &
Johnson
CSX
Praxair
McDonald's
S & P 500

26.25%

-24.37%

-12.73%

10-year
return
-9.43%

87.58%
26.29%
19.25%

-5.59%
-6.95%
11.94%

7.42%
-0.88%
16.89%

16.46%
6.37%
24.97%

7.78%
7.45%

1.56%
1.65%

6.75%
0.84%

1.01%
3.73%

46.12%
9.21%
18.57%
14.43%

5.24%
3.85%
12.97%
-9.79%

20.26%
12.34%
22.46%
-0.79%

18.65%
16.95%
9.44%
-1.59%

Index

3. Warren Buffett, Buy American. I am., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2008),
at
available
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/opinion/17buffett.html?pagewanted=print.
4. Christopher Farrell, The Problem with Pension Plans, BUS. WK.
2002),
11,
(Jan.
ONLINE
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflashljan2002/nf2002011l3044.htm.
5. Bruce Meyerson, All Business: 401(k) Savers Should Heed Lessons of
Enron, COLUMBIAN (VANCOUVER, WA) (June 12, 2004), available at
www.westlaw.com (accessed by searching for 2004 WLNR 11543921).
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investments in employer stock. In this regard, the individuals and
entities responsible for the administration of 401(k) plans, and
frequently the members of the companies' board of directors, have
been sued by 401(k) participants under ERISA for breach of
fiduciary duty. Usually the class action complaints allege that the
plan's investment in employer stock was imprudent and/or that
certain misrepresentations or omissions were made about the
company's financials that precluded participants from making
informed decisions about their investment in employer stock.6
In cases involving employer-directed contributions, as well as
cases involving participant-directed contributions, the allegations
of many of these cases sound very much like matters that would be
alleged as violations of federal securities laws but for the fact that
the plaintiffs are participants in a plan governed by ERISA. In
fact, many of the same plaintiffs have brought suits alleging
securities law violations in addition to bringing ERISA lawsuits.
A bright line rule has not yet developed as to liability in these
stock drop cases. In fact, to date, very few of these cases have been
fully litigated.7 Motions to dismiss have been granted8 or denied,9
6. The disclosure claims are beyond the scope of this Article. See Jeffrey
Mamorsky & Jose Jara, Subprime Mortgage Crisis Impacts ERISA Plan
Investment in Employer Stock, 24 J. COMP. & BENEFITS 2, 5 (2008) (discussing
disclosure obligations).
7. Landgraff v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. of Am., 2000 WL
33726564, at *19 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) ("[i]n summary, the Court finds that the
plaintiffs have not established that a reasonable fiduciary would have
determined that the investment of the [Plan] assets in Columbia/HCA stock
was imprudent, thereby rebutting the presumption of reasonableness afforded
to defendants' actions."); DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 756,
786 (E.D. Vir. 2006) (finding that the defendant fiduciaries met their duties of
procedural prudence because of the existence of the SPD and its myriad of
disclosures and warnings regarding the company stock fund, regular meetings
regarding the sustainability of the company stock fund, appointment of an
independent fiduciary, and good faith belief in the legitimacy of the U.S.
Airways restructuring plan to stave off bankruptcy); Nelson v. Hoodwall, 512
F.3d 347, 350 (7th Cir. 2008) ("With or without the [Moench] presumption ...
it is clear that the defendants here all viewed continued investments in
IPALCO and AES as an appropriate and suitable investment option....");
Brieger v. Tellabs, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 848, 863-64 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (deferring
to a fiduciary's good faith investigation and reasonable belief in the soundness
of investment decisions).
8. In re Lehman Brothers Secs. and ERISA Litig., 683 F. Supp. 2d 294,
301-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing complaint because the committee members
could not have known of an imminent corporate collapse or other dire
situation); In re Williams Cos. ERISA Litig., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1338 (N.D.
Okla. 2003) (dismissing claims against board members for not correcting
inaccurate disclosures and failing to monitor the benefits committee, which
continued plan investments in company stock); In re Sprint Corp. ERISA
Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1229-30 (D. Kan. 2004) (granting directors
motion to dismiss certain ERISA claims including prudent investment and
inadequate disclosures); Crowley ex rel. Corning, Inc. Inv. Plan v. Corning,
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motions for summary judgment have been granted or denied,10 and
a large number of settlements have been reached." Over the past
decade, these settlements have totaled over $1 billion. 12 Yet,
despite these risks and uncertainties, many employers still offer
employees the opportunity to invest in the employer's common

Inc., 2004 WL 763873, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing the case and finding
that company and board members are not fiduciaries under ERISA).
9. Dann v. Lincoln National Corp., 708 F. Supp. 2d 481 (E.D. Penn. 2010)
(denying defendants' motion to dismiss because "[w]ith the present interest in
the etiology of the financial crisis, it would be irresponsible to cut off discovery
into the allegations in the Amended Complaint at this stage of the litigation.");
Hill v. BellSouth Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (noting
defendants' motion to dismiss was denied); In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. ERISA
Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 658, 668-69 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (determining that board of
directors had fiduciary status under ERISA because they had authority to
appoint other fiduciaries and rejected the defendants' arguments that the
"ESOP presumption" bars plaintiffs' claim); In re CMS Energy ERISA Litig.,
312 F. Supp. 2d 898, 907-08 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (granting defendant's motion to
dismiss based because the directors and officers could not have breached their
fiduciary duties for failing to amend the plans to eliminate the employer stock
investments, but also finding that the individual directors and officers could
have breached their ERISA fiduciary duties by failing to take other actions to
protect the value of participants' plan assets depending on the "responsibilities
actually assumed by them"); Kling v. Fidelity Mgmt. Trust Co., 323 F. Supp.
2d 132, 150 (D. Mass. 2004) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss); Rankin
v. Rots, 278 F. Supp. 2d 853, 879 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (denying defendants'
motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs adequately alleged fiduciary status of
board members); Pa. Fed'n v. Norfolk S. Corp. Thoroughbred Ret. Inv. Plan,
2004 WL 228685, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (refusing to apply the ESOP
presumption at the 12(b)(6) motion stage, but noting that the plaintiff must
overcome this presumption at summary judgment or trial stage).
10. Stanford v. Foamex, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112283 (E.D. Penn. Sept.
30, 2011) (granting defendants' summary judgment motion in part and
denying it in part); George v. Kraft Foods, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76473 (N.D.
Ill. July 14, 2011) (same); McGabe v. Capital Mercury Apparel, 752 F. Supp.
2d 396 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) (granting defendants' motion for summary judgment).
11. In re Hartford Fin. Servs., 2010 WL 135186, at *1 (D. Conn. 2010)
(noting $1.925 million for stock drop claim arising from the credit crisis);
Stanford v. Foamex L.P., 263 F.R.D. 156, 160 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (noting $3.6
million in claim arising out of the liquidation of employer stock); In re YRC
Worldwide, Inc. ERISA Litig., 2011 WL 1303367, at *2 (D. Kan. 2011) (noting
$6.5 million settlement of stock drop claim); Taylor v. ANB Bancshares, Inc.,
682 F. Supp. 2d 970, 972 (W.D. Ark. 2009) (noting $2 million to resolve ESOP
claims arising from unsafe and unsound business practices); In re
MCI/WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 2004 WL 2338151, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(noting settlement announced in July 2004: $51 million from company and
insurers; $4 million from former director and CEO); In re Global Crossing
Secs. and ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting $79
million settlement reached in March 2004); In re Lucent Techs., Inc. ERISA
Litig., 327 F.Supp.2d 426, 430 (D.N.J. 2003) (noting $69 million settlement
reached in late 2003); Kolar v. Rite Aid Corp., 2003 WL 1257272, at *1-2 (E.D.
Pa. 2003) (noting settlement estimated at $67.7 million).
12. David K. Randall, Danger in Your 401(k), FORBES, Aug. 30, 2010, at 48.
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stock.13

There are a large number of ERISA class action lawsuits
claiming fiduciary breaches relating to the administration of
employee individual account plans ("EIAPs"), typically alleging
that fiduciaries should have minimized losses by liquidating the
employer stock in the retirement plan to avoid the effects of the
bear market. The alleged facts in these cases rely on the drop in
value of the employer's stock coupled with allegations regarding
the employer's plan design. The expensive litigation involving
employer stock lawsuits is ever-growing while the general public
thirsts to assign blame for the financial crisis facing the country's
retirement plans.
But in actuality, employee retirement savings plan
investments in employer stock further a congressional objective of
encouraging employee ownership. In furtherance of this public
policy, courts examining fiduciary breach claims involving
employer stock in retirement savings plans have repeatedly held
that plaintiffs must allege a "precipitous decline" in the price of
the stock before such suits can go forward. Thus, if no such
allegation exists, a suit cannot proceed. Such a burden helps to
prevent litigation over normal short-term trends in the fluctuation
of the market.
At times, the price of the stock actually fluctuates higher
during litigation, and sometimes substantially higher by the time
of trial than at the beginning of the class period. The burden to
demonstrate a "precipitous decline" filters out the prematurelypanicked plaintiffs with ill-conceived allegations that portray their
retirement savings plan investments in stock as the functional
equivalent of investments in Enron or WorldCom. In those
companies' well-publicized litigations, the courts held that the
plan sponsors' imminent financial collapse may be a sufficient
reason to require plan fiduciaries to take extraordinary measures
to override plan terms and discontinue investments in employer
stock.
To rebut allegations of a "precipitous decline," a defendant
can focus on factors that show financial stability and profitability,
such as paying consistent dividends to shareholders. ERISA is
designed to accomplish many worthwhile objectives, but the
regulation of "purely corporate behavior is not one of them."14
ERISA should not be construed to afford plaintiffs a method of

13. Id. (stating that "58% of large-company defined contribution pension
plans . .. offer employees a choice of receiving contributions in cash or
company stock of equal value," and that aside from offering the stock, certain
companies actually have participants' accounts heavily invested in common
stock: Coca-Cola 51%; McDonald's 45%; Caterpillar 44%, General Electric
42%).
14. Akers v. Palmer, 71 F.3d 226, 229 (6th Cir. 1995).
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challenging purely corporate behavior that has no legallycognizable impact on a plan, or on the long-term retirement
savings investments held therein.
The question that arises is whether the fiduciaries' actions
are entitled to a presumption of prudence as set forth in Moench v.
Robertson.15 This Article examines the recent cases involving suits
for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA for the continued
investment in employer stock. There is no current uniform
standard of review and many cases have yet to go to trial.
However, given the trend of increasingly substantial litigation
costs and the need to review the overall performance of a
retirement investment only with a "precipitous decline," clearly
the proper standard courts should use to analyze employer stock
cases in ERISA litigation is a fiduciary presumption of prudence,
as fluctuations in the market will likely always occur.
This Article proposes a uniform standard to apply in the
context of employer stock investments in retirement plans. Part II
discusses the background of ERISA, the types of retirement plans,
and the identity and respective duties of fiduciaries. Part III
explains the modern portfolio theory and its shortcomings. Part IV
addresses the investment in employer stock in defined
contribution plans and the presumption of prudence. Finally, Part
V presents the conflicts among the circuit courts and sets forth the
correct standard of prudence that the Supreme Court should adopt
to have some uniformity in this particular area of ERISA
jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND - ERISA

Employees' retirement accounts are protected by the statute
known as ERISA. Its origins are derived from the Studebaker Co.
bankruptcy in December 1963, which left many workers without
retirement savings and led to many years of legislative study.
Congress passed ERISA in 1974 with the intent of establishing
"minimum standards of fiduciary conduct for Trustees,
Administrators and others dealing with retirement plans ... and
to improve the equitable character and soundness of private
pension plans." 6
ERISA is a complicated statute to navigate, as the Second
Circuit once eloquently stated "[in truth, ERISA is a veritable
Sargasso Sea of obfuscation."17 Crucial to an ERISA analysis is the
determination of the status of the parties involved. Particularly,
fiduciaries must be located and their ERISA-mandated duties
15.
16.
4639,
17.

Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1995).
H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 16 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4655.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F. 3d 708, 717 (2d. Cir. 1993).
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must be applied to them. Then the actions performed by these
fiduciaries must be analyzed to determine which are "settlor" in
nature. As will be discussed later in greater detail, settlor actions
are actions individuals partake in their corporate capacity, and not
fiduciary capacity. Acting in a settlor capacity is a defense to
liability.
A. Defined ContributionPlans
Pension plans's are plans or arrangements that, by their
terms or operations, either provide for retirement income or defer
income until the termination of employment or beyond. Pension
plans that are Code-qualified are funded and generally have an
established accompanying trust.
There are many types of pension plans. The traditional plan,
also known as a "defined benefit plan," is a pension plan that
provides a definite formula with which the amount of a
participant's pension benefit is determined. In a defined benefit
plan, the employer bears the investment risk, as its contributions
are actuarially determined each year based on the benefit formula
and factors such as the compensation, age, and service of
participants, as well as the fund's investment performance.
More popular today and more important to the issue of
investments in employer stock are plans known as "defined
contribution plans" ("DC Plans"). These pension plans provide an
individual account for each participant, whereby a participant's
benefit is determined by the value of his or her account. Thus, the
participant bears the investment risk. Each participant's account
is based on the amount of contributions allocated to the account
plus any income, expense, and investment gain or loss credited to
or charged against the account. Money purchase, profit sharing,
stock bonus, 401(k), and employee stock ownership plans
("ESOPs") are all forms of DC Plans. Defined as eligible individual
account plans, they are statutorily termed as follows: "(i) a profitsharing, stock bonus, thrift, or savings plan, or (ii) an employee
stock ownership plan," which "explicitly provides for acquisition
and holding of qualifying employer securities." 19 "Qualifying
employer securities" are stock issued by an employer of employees
covered by the plan. 20
18. In general, qualified plans enjoy certain tax advantages under the
Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") including (a) from the company's
perspective, immediate tax deductions for employer contributions to the plan;
(b) from the employees' perspective, tax deferral on such contributions and the
earnings on such contributions; and (c) from the perspective of the trust
holding the contributions, tax exemption on the earnings. I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(28)(A) (2012).
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1107(d)(3)(A)-(B).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1107(d)(5)(A) and (d)(1).
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A special type of EIAP designed to serve as an employer stock
bonus plan is known as an Employee Stock Ownership Plan. 21
ESOPs are intended to reward and motivate employees by making
them stakeholders in the success of the company that employs
them, typically through stock-matching contributions. By linking
employee compensation to the actual performance of the company,
productivity and general worker utility is generally perceived as
enhanced. 22 ESOPs mandatorily include employer stock as an
option in a retirement investment portfolio.
To qualify as an ESOP, the plan must be "designed to invest
primarily in employer stock."23 This requirement has not yet been
interpreted by the IRS or the courts. The phrase implies that in
order for the plan, or a portion thereof, to qualify as an ESOP, it
must invest or hold the major portion of its plan assets in
employer securities. However, there are no bright line quantitative
tests to apply. 24
Plans named in the employer stock drop cases typically
involve individual account plans under ERISA section 3(34),25
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6).
22. Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1458 (5th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that ESOPs are employee benefit plans in which the employees
invest in securities issued by the employer).
23. DOL Advisory Opinion, No. 83-6 (Jan. 24, 1983) (declining to establish
a fixed, quantitative standard for the "primarily invested" requirement, but
emphasizing that the applicable requirements are flexible and vary according
to the facts and circumstances of each case).
24. Id. Furthermore, in terms of diversification, the Tax Reform Act of
1986 amended the Code to permit participants who have attained at least age
fifty five with at least ten years of plan participation to elect to "diversify"
their ESOP account in non-employer securities. Under Code section
401(a)(28)(A), each such "qualified participant" must be given the opportunity
to direct the plan as to the investment of at least twenty five percent of his or
her employer stock account for five years and on the sixth year the participant
must be provided with the option to direct at least fifty percent of his or her
employer stock account. I.R.C. § 401(a)(28)(A) (2012). This requirement is met
if the qualified participant is able to elect to have the portion of his or her
account subject to the diversification election either be distributed to him or
her or be invested among at least three investment options other than
employer securities. Id,
While it is clear that the statutorily mandated age fifty five and ten years of
participation diversification election can be broadened to a degree without a
plan failing to continue to qualify as an ESOP, it is unclear how far such
diversification election can be extended. Arguably as long as a plan is
"designed" to primarily invest in employer securities at least initially,
subsequent participant diversification elections are irrelevant if at least more
than half of the ESOP portion remains invested in employer stock. However,
we cannot predict the extent of participant elections nor whether the IRS
would view the proposed unrestricted diversification provision which provides
for momentary investment in employer stock as being mere form over
substance inconsistent with the "designed to primarily invest in employer
securities" requirement.
25. ERISA section 3(34) defines an "individual account plan" as "a pension
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which are often described as defined contribution plans. As the
name suggests, investments in such plans are given preferential
treatment under Code section 401(k). Moreover, these plans are
designed to encourage employees to save for their retirement and
"other long-term goals." Generally, these plans permit employees
to defer a percentage of their salary on a pre-tax basis. Some plans
also provide employer-matching contributions for up to 6 percent
of a participant's compensation from the employer. In addition,
sometimes the plan sponsor may make additional discretionary
contributions to participants' accounts. But unlike traditional
defined benefit pension plans, participants bear the investment
26
risk in defined contribution savings plans.
Participants may invest their contributions and their plan
sponsor's matching and additional contributions in several
different places, including in the plan sponsor's employer stock
fund ("Stock Fund"). 27 Certain plans allow up to one hundred
percent of its assets to be invested in the Stock Fund. In
accordance with ERISA, participants are given detailed
information about each investment option and they alone decide
how to invest their retirement money. Sometimes there are
restrictions on the participants' ability to transfer their money in
and out of a Stock Fund. Moreover, some plans require its
fiduciaries to invest in a Stock Fund only upon the participants'
direction.
In the aftermath of the Enron debacle, Congress attempted to
prevent the losses that occurred in retirement plans by passing the
plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for
benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's account,
and any income, expenses, gains and losses." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2008).
26. See Bash v. Firstmark Std. Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 163 (7th Cir.
1988) (asserting that to impose liability upon plan fiduciaries for account
losses in a defined contribution/individual account plan would give
participants "the best of both worlds" resulting in "an inequity of the heads I
win, tails you lose variety that neither the ERISA statute nor the ... plan
documents perpetrate"); see also Wright v. Oregon Metallurgical Corp., 360
F.3d 1090, 1097 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Unlike traditional pension plans
governed by ERISA, EIAPs .. . are not intended to guarantee retirement
benefits and indeed, by their very nature, 'place employee retirement assets at
much greater risk than does the typical diversified ERISA plan."') (quoting
Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 664 (8th Cir. 1992)); In re Unisys Say. Plan
Litig., 1997 WL 732473, at *25 n.30 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1997) (noting that the
participants in a defined contribution plan, not the employer, assume the risk
of loss for their investments); D. Fischel & J. H. Langbein, ERISA's
Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1105, 1112-13 (1988) ("Defined contribution and defined benefit plans allocate
investment risk oppositely. Under a defined contribution plan, the employee
bears the burden of disappointing results and pockets the gains from good
results.").
27. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780
(2006).

The John Marshall Law Review

550

[45:541

Pension Protection Act of 2006 ("PPA").2 8 The PPA mandates that
contribution plans offering publicly traded employer stock allow
participants and beneficiaries to divest themselves of employer
stock either immediately, with respect to employee contributions,
or after three years, with respect to employer contributions. 29
Furthermore, under PPA regulations, there is a 10 percent cap on
investment in employer stock. 30 However, this attempted
congressional fix has not been able to lessen the number of
employer-stock lawsuits that have been filed.

B. Elements of an ERISA Breach of FiduciaryDuty Claim
"[I]n every case charging breach of ERISA fiduciary duty, . . .
the threshold question is not whether the actions of some person
employed to provide services under a plan adversely affected a
plan beneficiary's interest, but whether that person was acting as
a fiduciary (that is, was performing a fiduciary function) when
taking the action subject to complaint."3 1 Before determining
whether there has been a breach of a duty, an actual duty as a
fiduciary must be established. Sometimes the question as to who is
a fiduciary is not clear. For example, it has been held that an
officer acting on behalf of a corporate fiduciary is not a fiduciary
unless it can be shown that the officer has individual discretion
regarding plan administration. 32 On the other hand, some courts
have held that, to the extent a person performs a fiduciary
function on behalf of a corporate fiduciary, that person is a
fiduciary.33

Section 409(a) of ERISA specifically provides for liability of
individual fiduciaries that breach their duties:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make
good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach, and to restore to such plan many profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such
fiduciary. 34
Thus, under ERISA sections 404 and 409, to plead a breach of

28. Id.
29. Id. at §§ 901(a) and (b).
30. Id. at § 1.401.
31. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 226 (2000).
32. Confer v. Custom Eng'g Co., 952 F.2d 34, 36 (3d Cir. 1991).
33. Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1460 (9th Cir. 1995); Musmeci
v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 332 F.3d 339, 351 (5th Cir. 2003).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
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fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendants are
plan fiduciaries; (2) the defendants breached their fiduciary duties;
and (3) the breach caused harm to the plaintiff.35
1. Standing
To have standing to sue under ERISA, a plaintiff must be "a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary" of a plan. 3 6 A "participant" is
defined as "any employee or former employee of an employer ...
who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from
an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such
employer."37 In order to establish that he or she is eligible or may
become eligible for benefits, a claimant must have a colorable
claim that (1) he or she will prevail in a suit for benefits, or that
38
(2) eligibility requirements will be fulfilled in the future.
Applying these provisions and principles, some courts have found
that class members who were former participants in a plan lack
standing. 39 Other courts have held that plaintiffs who were
participants in a plan at the time of the alleged breaches do have
standing under ERISA. 40 The weight of authority seems to favor
finding standing for plaintiffs who were former plan participants.
ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) provide that plan
participants may seek relief on behalf of the plan as a whole and
may seek equitable relief as to fiduciaries. 41 Therefore, in some
ERISA cases, defendants have sought to dismiss participants'
claims for lack of standing, arguing that what plaintiffs in these
cases truly seek is monetary relief for plan participants in their
individual capacity. 42 However, the Supreme Court has ruled that
former participants may bring suit under ERISA 502(a)(2) to
35. Jenkins v. Yager, 444 F.3d 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2006).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7).
38. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 480 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1989).
39. See, e.g., Renton v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 2001 WL 1218773,
at *5 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("Under the plain language of ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions, class members who are former, but not current
participants in a ... plan lack standing to bring the claims alleged in the
complaint.").
40. See, e.g., Rots, 220 F.R.D. at 519-20 (E.D. Mich. 2004) ("Rankin was a
participant in the Kmart plan during the time when the alleged breaches of
fiduciary duty occurred. She was paid her vested benefit when the Kmart store
she was employed at closed. To find that she lacks standing would permit
Kmart to exclude potential class members by simply paying them their vested
benefits. ERISA should not be interpreted to circumvent a plaintiffs recovery
in this manner."); Vartanian v. Monsanto, 14 F.3d 697, 702 (1st Cir. 1994)
(finding that ERISA's legislative history indicated that the Plaintiff did have
standing).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2008).
42. See, e.g., In re AEP ERISA Litig., 327 F.Supp.2d 812, 818 (S.D. Ohio
2004) (refusing to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing).
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redress harm to an individual participant's account. 43

2. The ERISA Fiduciaries
ERISA-Defined Fiduciary

a.

Congress intended retirement plans to be safeguarded by
fiduciaries, and defined "fiduciary" under ERISA as follows:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan,
or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.44
Thus, "[fliduciary status is not an all or nothing concept ....
[A] court must ask whether a person is a fiduciary with respect to
the particular activity in question." 45
b. De Facto Fiduciary
ERISA requires that every benefit plan document designate a
"named fiduciary" who has the authority to control and manage
the operations of the plan. 46 A "named fiduciary" is defined as:
[A] fiduciary who is named in the plan instrument, or who, pursuant
to a procedure specified in the plan, is identified as a fiduciary (A)
by a person who is an employer or employee organization with
respect to the plan or (B) by such an employer and such an employee
organization acting jointly.47
In the first instance, it is the named fiduciary who has
fiduciary responsibility to the plan. However, others acting in a
fiduciary capacity to the plan may also be fiduciaries under
ERISA, regardless of the named fiduciary designation.
The Supreme Court has held that fiduciary status is based on
a functional test that focuses on a person's actions or authority,
LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg &Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 266 (2008).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2008); see also Beddall v. State St. Bank and
Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing the factors a court relies
on to determine the existence of a fiduciary relationship); Kling v. Fidelity
Mgmt. Trust Co., 323 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D. Mass. 2004) (hereinafter Kling
I7) (discussing the application of the definition of a fiduciary provided in 18
U.S.C § 1002(21)(A) with respect to a particular activity).
45. Maniance v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 40 F.3d 264, 267 (8th Cir.
43.
44.

1994).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
47. Id. at (a)(2).
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not on his or her formal designation. 48 Therefore, under ERISA,
anyone - irrespective of the person's formal title or designation may become a fiduciary if he or she exercises or has any
discretionary authority or control over plan administration or
assets. Integral to ERISA fiduciary status is the level of
"discretion" exercised over the plan as it relates to the investment
and disposition of the plan assets. 49 Importantly, a person may
qualify as an ERISA fiduciary with regard to discretion over
certain matters, but not others.50 An individual's specific function
in overseeing plan assets is the determinative factor in the
threshold fiduciary analysis, particularly as it relates to the
control, disposition, and administration of plan assets.5 1
Lawsuits claiming breaches of fiduciary duty must first prove,
as a threshold matter, that the defendant was acting in a fiduciary
manner "when taking the action subject to complaint."5 2 If not,
ERISA fiduciary obligations are inapplicable and the individual is
considered merely a settlor under the statute. The U.S.
Department of Labor ("DOL") has clarified that settlor activities
are traditionally related to the establishment, design, amendment,
and termination of plans, rather than functional discretionary
control over them as a going concern. 53
Furthermore, this exercise of discretionary authority or
control is to be contrasted with a person who "performs purely
ministerial functions for an employee benefit plan within a
framework of rules and procedures made by other persons." Such a
person is "not a fiduciary because he does not have discretionary
authority regarding administration of the plan or management of
the plan assets."54 Because of this functional test, the
determination of one's fiduciary status is fact intensive.5 5

48. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993).
49. In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 2011).
50. Id.
51. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th Cir. 2009).
52. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 302 F.3d
18, 28 (2d Cir. 2002).
53. Field Assistance Bulletin 2002-2, Memorandum From Robert J. Doyle,
Dir. Of Regulations and Interpretations, U.S. Dept. of Labor, to Virginia C.
Smith, Dir. of Enforcement, Regional Directors, U.S. Dept. of Labor (Nov. 4,
2002) available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab_2002-2.html.
54. Kuper v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 838 F. Supp. 342, 347 (S.D. Ohio
1993) (citing Flacche v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 958 F.2d 730, 734
(6th Cir. 1992)).
55. Bell v. Exec. Comm. of the United Food & Commercial Workers
Pension Plan for Emps., 191 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15 (D.D.C. 2000); see also In re
Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 250 B.R. 168, 204-05 (D. Del. 2000) (noting that
merely alleging a fiduciary relationship would be insufficient under Fed. R. of
Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Penn. Fed'n v. Norfolk S. Corp., 2004 WL 228685, at *11
(E.D. Pa. 2004) ("Determining a party's fiduciary status under ERISA is a
highly fact intensive inquiry that cannot be properly decided on a motion to

554

The John MarshallLaw Review

[45:541

Even so, the Supreme Court has held that fiduciary status is
to be "construed liberally."5 6 A person need not have exclusive or
final decision-making authority to be a fiduciary - he or she only
has to have some discretionary authority or control.5 7 Some courts,
using a literal reading of the statute, have determined that to the
extent one exercises any control over the assets of a plan, it is not
necessary that such exercise be "discretionary."5 8
The power to appoint/remove plan fiduciaries is itself a
fiduciary function.59 Thus, if one's fiduciary function is to appoint
plan administrators or other plan fiduciaries, he or she will
generally be found to have a duty to monitor such appointees
under ERISA.60
dismiss."); LaLonde v. Textron, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 272, 285 (D.R.I. 2003),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 369 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (refusing to rule on
the fiduciary status of defendants on motion to dismiss because it was too fact
specific of an inquiry).
56. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. v. Harris Trust
& Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 96 (1993); see also Am. Fed. of Unions Local 102
Health & Welfare Fund v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 841 F.2d 658, 662
(5th Cir. 1988) (giving the term "fiduciary" a liberal construction).
57. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113 (1989) (noting that ERISA "does not
characterize a fiduciary as one who exercises entirely discretionary authority
or control. Rather, one is a fiduciary to the extent he exercises any
discretionary authority or control.").
58. See In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp.
2d 511, 544-45 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (describing the cases that have made the
distinction between discretionary control over the administration of the plan
and any control over the assets of the plan).
59. Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., N.A., 313 F. Supp. 2d 818, 864 (C.D. Ill. 2004);
Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1465 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[Tjhe
power.. . to appoint, retain and remove plan fiduciaries constitutes
'discretionary authority' over the management or administration of a
plan..."); Hickman v. Tosco Corp., 840 F.2d 564, 566 (8th Cir. 1988); Mehling
v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 2d 502, 509-10 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Newton v.
Van Otterloo, 756 F.Supp. 1121, 1132 (N.D. Ind. 1989); Liss v. Smith, 991
F.Supp. 278, 310-311 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("It is by now well-established that the
power to appoint plan trustees confers fiduciary status.").
60. Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 669-70 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that
corporate directors' power to appoint an ESOP trustee includes a duty to
monitor the trustee); Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 511; Elec. Data Sys., 305 F.
Supp. 2d at 671 ("Although the Court accepts the duty to monitor's existence,
the Court makes no holding regarding the duty's scope.... The Court simply
holds that some duty to monitor does exist and that Plaintiffs have sufficiently
pled a possible cause of action sufficient to allow them access to discovery.");
Sears, 2004 WL 407007, at * 7 ("Under ERISA guidelines, a fiduciary who
delegates responsibility or appoints other fiduciaries has a duty to monitor
those delegates."); In re Xcel Energy, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (D. Minn.
2004) ("Implicit in the fiduciary duties attaching to persons empowered to
appoint and remove plan fiduciaries is the duty to monitor appointees."). But
see Beauchem v. Rockford Prods., 2003 WL 1562561, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(holding that appointment power did not necessarily require duty to monitor);
Williams Cos., 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1339 (maintaining that a board's fiduciary
responsibility is limited to the appointment act itself); Corning, 234 F. Supp.
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c. Limitation of Fiduciary Status: Defining "Settlor"
A person is generally a fiduciary only with respect to those
aspects of the plan over which he or she exercises discretionary
authority and control.6 1 An individual who only has discretionary
authority or control to appoint plan administrators will only be a
fiduciary with respect to those actions. 62 Moreover, directors whose
only fiduciary authority is to appoint plan administrators may not
be liable for the actions of the fiduciary it appoints.63
ERISA's reach is narrow: the statute regulates only the
administration of benefits plans, and participants cannot invoke
the statute's fiduciary standards to challenge activities related to
the running of the business. 64 Although individuals may serve as a
fiduciary while in the plan sponsor's employ, only their fiduciary
conduct can be challenged under ERISA. This principle, known as
the "two hats" doctrine, means that when individuals act in a
2d at 229 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (same).
61. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (determining that liability of fiduciaries is
limited to particular fiduciary functions performed); Beddall, 137 F.3d at 18
("Fiduciary status is not an all or nothing proposition."); Drug Stores Co. Emp.
Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan, 883 F.2d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 1989); Bannistor
v. Ullman, 287 F.3d 394, 401 (5th Cir. 2002).
62. Williams Cos., 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1339; Corning, 234 F. Supp. 2d at
229 (dismissing board members because the "only power the Board had under
the plan was to appoint, retain or remove members of the Committee;" the
board could not be liable for fiduciary breaches with respect to alleged
investment-related breaches); Sprint, 2004 WL 1179371, at *17; In re
WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 283 F. Supp. 2d 745, 760-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Batchelor v. Oak Hill Med. Grp., 870 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating
that physicians operating clinics could only be subject to ERISA fiduciary
duties concerning selection and retention of plan administrators); Leigh v.
Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 133-35 (7th Cir. 1984) (asserting that parties with power
to select and retain plan administrators were fiduciaries for the purpose of
making such selections); Indep. Ass'n of Publishers Emps., Inc. v. Dow Jones
& Co., 671 F. Supp. 1365, 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that an employer, who
retained power to appoint, renew, or remove members of advisory committee,
had fiduciary duties under ERISA only with respect to such acts); cf. Chicago
Bd. Option Exch. Inc., v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 254, 259 (7th Cir.
1983) (determining that a company with power to amend annuity contract was
fiduciary only with regard to amending that contract).
63. Kuper, 838 F. Supp. at 347 (granting summary judgment and
dismissing board members because their fiduciary duties were limited to the
board's "appoint and remove" powers and because there was no showing that
the board influenced the investment decisions of the committee it appointed or
knew of any wrongdoing by the committee) affd sub nom., Kuper v. Iovenko,
66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995).
64. Husvar v. Rapoport, 337 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that
defendants' mismanagement of the company so as to result in a dramatic
decrease in the value of the [employer's] stock," which "happened to devalue
the ESOP funded with such stock," did not state ERISA claims because "[a]
claim that the company directors did not operate the business itself in
conformity with sound business practices does not ... implicate the
protections afforded by ERISA.").
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corporate capacity, ERISA's fiduciary rules do not apply to their
actions even if they also serve as ERISA fiduciaries. 65 Therefore, to
state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs must allege
that each defendant acted as a fiduciary when they purportedly
misrepresented or withheld material information to participants.6 6
Under the "two hats" doctrine, an individual, such as a
corporate director, may function in both fiduciary and
corporate/non-fiduciary capacities, but not at the same time.67
When acting in a fiduciary capacity, the fiduciary must act
exclusively for the benefit of plan participants. Yet, employers
have significant leeway to adjust the plan without incurring
fiduciary duties.6 8 Thus, it becomes difficult for a plaintiff to show
a link between a defendant's discretionary control and the breach
causing the plaintiffs harm.
The "two hats" doctrine has also been defined as follows:
[W]here an administrator of a plan decides matters required in plan
administration or involving obligations imposed upon the
administrator by the plan, the fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA
attach. Where, however, employees conduct business and make
business decisions not regulated by ERISA, no fiduciary duties
apply. And, when employers wear "two hats" as employers and as
administrators ... they assume fiduciary status "only when and to
the extent" that they function in their capacity as plan
administrators, not when they conduct business that is not
regulated by ERISA. 69
Furthermore when those with "two hats" make a decision
concerning the design of a plan, this decision is not subject to
ERISA's fiduciary duties, but the decision makers will be subject
to such duties when the decision concerns the plan's

65. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225-26; 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2008) (stating
that ERISA Section 3(21)(A) provides that a person is a fiduciary "only 'to the
extent' the [person] acts in such a capacity in relation to a plan."); Amato v.
Western Union Int'l, 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (2d Cir. 1985) ("ERISA permits
employers to wear 'two hats,' and .. . they assume fiduciary status 'only when
and to the extent' that they function in their capacity as plan administrators,

not when they conduct business that is not regulated by ERISA.").

66. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2008) (stating that section 3(34) of ERISA
provides that "a person is a fiduciary with respect to the plan to the extent (i)

he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets"); Sasso v. Cervoni, 985 F.2d 49, 50

(2d Cir. 1993) ("[A]n individual cannot be liable as an ERISA fiduciary solely
by virtue of her position as a corporate officer, shareholder or manager.").
67. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506-07 (1996); Siskind v. Sperry
Ret. Prog., 47 F.3d 498, 505 (2d Cir. 1995); Akers, 71 F.3d at 230.
68. Sasso, 985 F.2d at 50.

69. Payonk v. HMW Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1989).
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administration. 70 The Third Circuit has applied an expansive
conception of "design," so that many plan-related decisions simply
71
do not implicate ERISA fiduciary duties. Thus, employers have
the power to amend, merge, or even terminate plans entirely
without triggering such duties. 72
Some cases require that fiduciaries have discretionary
control. For example, the First Circuit has stated that:
The key determinant of whether a person qualifies as a functional
fiduciary is whether that person exercises discretionary authority in
respect to, or meaningful control over, an ERISA plan, its
administration, or its assets.... We make two points that inform
the application of this rule. First, the mere exercise or physical
control or the performance of mechanical administrative tasks
generally is insufficient to confer fiduciary status. Second, fiduciary
status is not an all or nothing proposition; the statutory language
indicates that a person is a plan fiduciary only "to the extent" that
he possesses or exercises the requisite discretion and control.
Because one's fiduciary responsibility under ERISA is directly and
solely attributable to his possession or exercise of discretionary
authority, fiduciary liability arises in specific increments correlated
to the vesting or performance of particular fiduciary functions in
73
service of the plan, not in broad, general terms.
A Massachusetts case emphasizes that, to maintain a cause of
action for a breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff "must plead first
that the defendant was a fiduciary with respect to [the relevant
plan] and that he or she breached a duty to that Plan that related
74
to matters within his or her discretion or control."
70. See, e.g., Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d 279, 282-285 (3d
Cir. 1989) ("ERISA is not a direction to employers as to what benefits to grant
their employees. Rather, ERISA is concerned with the administration of an
established plan and its elements.. . . The design of this plan was
unquestionably not violative of ERISA because [the employer] in drafting the
plan was acting as an employer and not a fiduciary."); see also Nazay v. Miller,
949 F.3d 1323, 1329-31 (3d Cir. 1991) (asserting that employers occupy, under
certain circumstances, two hats under ERISA's mandates).
71. Walling v. Brady, 125 F.3d 114, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1997).
72. See, e.g., id. (noting that "amending, altering, terminating, or otherwise
redesigning the plan itself' are functions considered "not fiduciary"); see also
Jackson v. Truck Drivers' Union Local 42 Health & Welfare Fund, 933 F.
Supp. 1124, 1142-43 (D. Mass. 1996) (citing Curtis-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995), and referring to Am. Flint Glass
Workers Union v. Beaumont Glass Co., 62 F.3d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 1995)
(concerning pension plan)) ("'Employers or other plan sponsors are generally
free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate
welfare plans"').
73. Beddall, 137 F.3d at 18.
74. Stein v. Smith, 270 F. Supp. 2d 157, 166 (D. Mass. 2003); see also Kling
III, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 3 (D. Mass. 2003) (asserting that "discretion is the sine
qua non of fiduciary duty").
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However, some courts have determined that while
discretionary control over management or plan administration is
needed to make one a fiduciary, any sort of control over a plan's
assets is sufficient. This difference springs from the ERISA
definition of "fiduciary," which states that one is a fiduciary to the
extent that one "exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or
exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets," or "has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan."75
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has held that an
employer acts as a plan settlor, and not a fiduciary. Examples of
settlor functions include establishing, designing, amending, or
terminating an ERISA plan.7 6
The Seventh Circuit has also acknowledged that an employer
may design a pension plan with features of its choosing." More
recently, that court has emphasized the definition of a settlor by
stating that inclusion of particular "investment vehicles in [a]
plan ... bears more resemblance to the basic structuring of a plan
than to its day-to-day management . .. . We therefore question

whether

[the

company's]

investments] .. . is even

fiduciary responsibilities." 78

decision

to

[designate

a decision within

[the

particular
company's]

Directors and Officers as Fiduciaries
Directors and officers ("D & Os") have been held to be ERISA
fiduciaries, to the extent that they have or exercise discretionary
authority or control over the administration or assets of a plan.7 9
Typically, D & Os only have the authority to appoint and remove
others who perform the administrative functions of the plan. In
such cases, D & Os can be ERISA fiduciaries with respect to such
appointments.80
d.

75. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) and (iii) (2008).
76. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444 (1999)
(noting that activities related to the formation and design rather than
management of the plans are settlor functions); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517
U.S. 882, 890 (1996)(same); Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 78 (same);
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 226 (same); Beck v. PACE, Int'l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 102110 (2007) (same).
77. See McNab v. Gen. Motors Corp., 162 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the employer is free to choose the features of its plan so long
as those choices are not arbitrary or capricious).
78. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009), pet. for reh'g
and reh'g en banc denied, 569 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2009) and cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1141 (2010).
79. Beddall, 137 F.3d at 18.
80. Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 133-34 (7th Cir. 1984); Corning, 234 F.
Supp. 2d at 229; Beam v. HSBC Bank USA, 2003 WL 22087589, at *2-3
(W.D.N.Y. 2003); Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 511; Rankin, 278 F. Supp. 2d at
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A regulation from the Department of Labor also provides that
D & Os are ERISA fiduciaries to the extent that they have
responsibility for the selection and retention of other plan
fiduciaries.81 With respect to directors, this regulation states:
Members of the board of directors of an employer which maintains
an employee benefit plan will be fiduciaries only to the extent that
they have responsibility for the functions described in section
3(21)(A) of the Act. For example, the board of directors may be
responsible for the selection and retention of plan fiduciaries. In
such a case, members of the board of directors exercise
"discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan" and are, therefore, fiduciaries with
respect to the plan. However, their responsibility, and,
consequently, their liability, is limited to the selection and retention
of fiduciaries (apart from co-fiduciary liability arising under
circumstances described in section 405(a) of the Act). In addition, if
the directors are made named fiduciaries of the plan, their liability
may be limited pursuant to a procedure provided for in the plan
instrument for the allocation of fiduciary responsibilities among
named fiduciaries or for the designation of persons other than
named fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary responsibilities, as provided
in section 405(c)(2). The Internal Revenue Service notes that it
would reach the same answer to this question under section
4975(e)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.82
Certain courts have held that D & Os are not ERISA
fiduciaries in the absence of express individual authority for plan
administration:
[W]hen an ERISA plan names a corporation as fiduciary within the
meaning of section 3(21)(A)(iii), the officers who exercise discretion
on behalf of that corporation are not fiduciaries within the meaning
of section 3(21)(A)(iii), unless it can be shown that these officers
have individual discretionary roles as to plan administration. For
example, if the plan designates an officer as plan administrator or
if, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 105(c)(1)(B), the corporation delegates
some of its fiduciary responsibilities to an officer, then the
designated individual would be a fiduciary under Section
3(21)(A)(iii). 83
In Confer v. Custom Engineering Company, the plan
document named the corporation, rather than an individual or
committee, as the named fiduciary of the plan. D & Os have

857; Stein, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 162; Keach, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 864; Sears, 2004

WL 407007, at *3; Williams Cos., 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1328.
81. 29 C.F.R. 2509.75-8 (2008).
82.

Id.

83.

Confer, 952 F.2d at 37.
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sought to use Confer to support the broad proposition that they
cannot be fiduciaries under ERISA unless specifically designated
to act in such role. 84

In Eyler v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,85 an ESOP

valuation case, the plan named the company as fiduciary.
However, the court determined that the board members were
fiduciaries because the company acted through the board. The
court did not analyze how, under the Confer theory, the board
members were given discretionary control over the plan in their
individual rather than corporate capacity. 86
The weight of authority seems to favor a rejection of a brightline rule shielding D & Os from ERISA fiduciary liability unless
they are fiduciaries in a personal, rather than a corporate,
capacity. One district court, in Bell v. Executive Committee of the

United Food and Commercial Workers Pension Plan for

Employees,87 recognized the "widespread disagreement among
courts" over the Confer reasoning and concluded:
While the courts have considered this issue in a variety of ways, in
all the rulings, in accordance with 29 U.S.C. 1002(21)(A) and
Mertens, the facts of the case affect whether an individual is found
to be a fiduciary under the statute. Under the cases cited by the
parties, there is no per se rule against holding an individual
employed by the corporate fiduciary as an ERISA fiduciary, but
84. See Stein, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (noting that the plan in Confer named
the corporation as fiduciary whereas the plan in Stein named an
administrative committee as fiduciary); Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 552-53
(same); Bell, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (same); In re CMS Energy ERISA Litig.,
312 F. Supp. 2d 898, 902 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Some courts have agreed with the
reasoning of Confer. In Torre v. FederatedMut. Ins. Co., 854 F. Supp. 790, 813

(D. Kan. 1994), the court determined that one cannot be a "de facto" plan
administrator. The court noted that the individual defendant (who was not a
director of the company) had the authority to grant or deny claims for benefits
and negotiate settlements of benefit disputes and therefore exercised some
discretion over plan administration, but the court determined that he was not
an ERISA fiduciary. The court cited Confer for the proposition that when the
plan names the corporation as a fiduciary, employees of the corporation acting
"within the procedural framework established by the corporate fiduciary" are
not ERISA fiduciaries. Other courts have rejected Confer. Enron rejected a per
se rule of non-liability for D & Os acting on behalf of the corporation and
instead made a functional, fact-specific inquiry to assess "the extent of
responsibility and control exercised by the individual with respect to the Plan"
to determine if a corporate employee, and thus also the corporation, has
exercised sufficient discretionary authority and control to be deemed an
ERISA fiduciary and thus personally liable for a fiduciary breach. The Enron
court described how other courts have rejected an interpretation of Confer that
could shield D & Os from fiduciary liability under ERISA. Enron, 284 F. Supp.
2d at 552-53.
85. Eyler v. Comm'r, 88 F.3d 445, 460 (7th Cir. 2005)
86. Id.
87. Bell, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
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rather it is a factual determination involving an assessment of the
extent of responsibility and control exercised by the individual with
respect to the Plan. It seems that more likely than not that courts
outside Confer would reject its rationale and determine that D & Os
could be ERISA fiduciaries if they have or exercise discretionary
authority or control over the administration or assets of the plan,
regardless of whether they are acting in an individual or corporate
capacity.88

C. ERISA FiduciaryDuties
ERISA fiduciaries are bound by a prudent standard of care
inclusive of four intertwining obligations of plan stewardship:
exclusive purpose (the duty of loyalty), prudence (the duty of care),
the duty to diversify plan assets, and the duty to follow the terms
of the plan.8 9 Note that, as mentioned previously, there is a
qualified exemption from the prudent person standard for
"employer securities."9 0
Because of congressional preference for EIAP and ESOP
plans, the fiduciary standards governing such plan assets are
relaxed. Notably, EIAP fiduciaries are not bound by the duty to
diversify. Fiduciaries are not deemed to act imprudently by not
diversifying the assets of an EIAP but are still required to act
prudently in overseeing the plan assets.9 '
In determining the standard of care required, the Second,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit have adopted the
Moench presumption, derived from the Third Circuit case, Moench
v. Robertson.92 This watershed case held that a fiduciary meets his
duties by virtue of investing the plan assets in employer stock and,
in such cases, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the
fiduciary abused his discretion by investing in employer
securities. 93

1.

Exclusive Purpose

ERISA's exclusive purpose rule, a subsection of ERISA section
404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a), 94 requires that fiduciaries must act for
the exclusive purpose of providing plan benefits. This "exclusive

88. Id.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2008).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3)(B) (2008).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (2008).
92. Moench, 62 F.3d at 568.
93. Citigroup,662 F.3d at 137.
94. ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A) provides, in pertinent part that "a fiduciary
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and . .. for the exclusive purpose of (i) providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable
expenses of administering the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
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benefit" rule embodies the common law duty of loyalty. It limits
the use of plan assets (i) to pay plan benefits; and (ii) to pay plan
expenses that are reasonable and relate only to plan activities.9 5
This rule is expanded by the ERISA bar against "prohibited
transactions," which, in substance, codifies a generic list of
potential conflict of interest situations.9 6
ERISA expressly recognizes that employees of the plan
sponsor may serve as plan fiduciaries.9 7 Unlike fiduciaries under
the common law of trusts, ERISA fiduciaries are expressly
permitted to work for the plan sponsor and as mentioned above,
thereby wear "two hats."98 Under ERISA, a fiduciary's resignation
and the appointment of an independent fiduciary is required only
when an ERISA fiduciary "cannot ignore its self-interest" in
making a fiduciary decision.9 9 In other words, courts have
mandated resignation or removal of fiduciaries only when
particular conflicts arise that are qualitatively different from the
types of conflicts inherent when the plan fiduciary is the employer
or its employees.100 As the Western District of New York
explained:
[I]n Donovan the officers/trustees of the target company had an
additional, significant interest of their own in the context of the
outcome of the [takeover attempt that would oust their] corporate
control.... Here, in contrast, the conflicting interests the
defendants had to face - their interest as corporate officers to keep
the company afloat and the interest as fiduciaries to keep the Plan
fully funded - were of the nature that is inherent in the officers'
assumption of dual capacity.101
Similarly, plaintiffs tend to allege that inherent conflicts are

present whenever plan sponsor employees serve as fiduciaries to a
plan that holds employer stock. Indeed, officers and employees of a
company, as well as plan participants who invest in employer

stock, almost always benefit when the price of employer stock
95. Id.
96. See Erschick v. United Mo. Bank of Kan. City, N.A., 948 F.2d 660, 671
(10th Cir. 1991) ("[t]he court will not create a ... conflict of interest where
Congress and precedent have not indicated one.").
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) ("Nothing in section 1106 of this title shall be
construed to prohibit any fiduciary from ... serving as a fiduciary in addition
to being an officer, employee, agent, or other representative of a party in
interest.").
98. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225 ("Under ERISA a fiduciary may have
financial interests adverse to beneficiaries.").
99. Crowhurst v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 1999 WL 1027033, at *17 (C.D. Cal.
1999).
100. See, e.g., Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1982)
(noting that plan trustees increased plan holdings of company stock in
response to hostile tender offer).
101. Ches v. Archer, 827 F. Supp. 159, 170 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
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rises. ERISA permits, and indeed encourages, investment in
employer stock. Thus, there can be no violation of the exclusive
purpose rule where fiduciaries followed the express terms of the
plan, and those terms comport with ERISA.102 As the District of
Columbia Circuit held, in affirming dismissal of a similar claim:
[Plaintiffs] argue that the fiduciaries were subject to a conflict
because they sought to continue ownership of U.S. News by its
employees. But that interest was not some "outside" concern; rather,
by the terms of the Plan, it was an interest that Plan beneficiaries
shared, inseparable from their interests in the Plan itself.103
While a dual hat is not sufficient to prove a breach of
fiduciary duty, many courts have imposed the duty to disclose
material information to participants as part of the exclusive
purpose rule, but this is a developing and controversial area of the
law.104 Although a fiduciary duty to disclose is not specifically
enumerated in the statutory disclosure requirements, many courts
find an affirmative duty to disclose material facts to plan
participants under the general ERISA fiduciary provisions. Courts

102. See WorldCom, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 768 ("Plaintiffs' allegations that [an
alleged fiduciary defendant's] holding of WorldCom stock and participation in
its compensation program created a conflict of interest are insufficient by
themselves to state a claim under ERISA."); Wright, 360 F.3d at 1100
(affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' exclusive purpose claim where defendants
"complied with the Plan's lawful terms and were under no legal obligation to
deviate from those terms"); McElroy v. Smithkline Beecham Health & Welfare
Benefits Trust Plan for U.S. Emps., 340 F.3d 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2003) ("The
plan administrator's duty to administer a plan for the sole benefit of its
participants is qualified by his obligation to interpret a plan consistent with
the documents and instruments governing the plan."); Bennett v. Conrail
Matched Say. Plan Admin. Comm., 168 F.3d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) ("While
ERISA provides that a fiduciary must act '(A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i)
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;'. . . ERISA does no
more than protect the benefits which are due to an employee under a plan.").
Stated somewhat differently, the exclusive purpose rule does not impose a
duty on fiduciaries to maximize financial gains for participants in derogation
of the terms of a plan. E.g., Collins v. Pension & Inv. Comm., 144 F.3d 1279,
1282 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that duty to act for the "exclusive purpose" of
providing benefits does not "create an exclusive duty to maximize pecuniary
benefits" to participants; administrators must "act in accordance with [the]
plan document"); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 865 F.2d 364, 372
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (ruling the plan must be administered according to its terms
and not according to whether particular interpretation would provide greater
"pecuniary value" to participants; if plan is designed to hold employer stock,
fiduciaries may take into account the nonpecuniary benefits afforded by
employee-ownership stake in the company); Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp.,
875 F.2d 1075, 1078-80 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that whether fiduciary has
acted solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries is "not to be
judged in a vacuum but under the terms of the plan").
103. Foltz, 865 F.2d at 374.
104. Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 555.
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that have recognized this duty have generally done so based on the
fiduciary duty of loyalty set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
The Supreme Court has held that an ERISA fiduciary has a
duty not to mislead participants.10 5 In Varity Corporationv. Howe,
the employer/plan sponsor distributed materials and called a
meeting where it persuaded employees to transfer voluntarily to a
new subsidiary by intentionally misrepresenting that the
subsidiary was financially stable and that their employee benefits
would be secure.106
Other courts have required that a fiduciary who knows
certain material facts must affirmatively disclose them to
participants. 0 7 This duty to affirmatively disclose includes the
duty to provide all material information.108 Information is
considered "material" if it would induce reasonable reliance on the
information by the participant, 0 9 or if there is a substantial
likelihood that it would mislead a reasonable employee in making
an adequately informed decision.110
2. Duty of Prudence
The "prudent man" rule with regard to funds entrusted to a
fiduciary is derived from the 1830 case, Harvard College v.
Amory."' Pursuant to Harvard College, a trustee's duty consists
of:
...

conduct[ing] himself faithfully[,]

discretion[,]

observ[ing]

...

excercis[ing] ...

a sound

how men of prudence, discretion and

105. Varity, 516 U.S. at 489.
106. Id.
107. Glaziers and Glassworkers Union Local 252 Annuity Fund v.
Newbridge Secs., 93 F.3d 1171, 1180 (3d Cir. 1996); Bins v. Exxon Co. USA,
189 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1999) ("We believe that once an ERISA fiduciary has
material information relevant to a plan participant or beneficiary, it must
provide that information whether or not it is asked a question."); Ervast v.
Flexible Prods. Co., 346 F.3d 1007, 1015 (11th Cir. 2003); Krohn v. Huron
Mem'l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999); Bixler v. Cent. Penn.
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1301 (3d Cir. 1993).
108. Griggs v. E.E. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371, 381 (4th Cir.
2001); Schmidt v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 128 F.3d 541, 550
(7th Cir. 1997) ("A plan fiduciary may violate its duties ... either by
affirmatively misleading plan participants about the operations of the plan, or
by remaining silent in circumstances where silence could be misleading.").
109. See Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding that the change to an ERISA plan is only one factor in the inquiry).
110. See James v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 305 F.3d 439, 450 (6th Cir.
2002); Unisys, 74 F.3d at 442 (noting that, in the ERISA context, a
misrepresentation is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that it would
have misled a reasonable participant in making an adequately informed
decision about whether to place or maintain monies" in a particular
investment option).
111. Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 461 (1830).
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intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation,
but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, [and]
considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of
the capital to be invested.112
Under ERISA, a fiduciary must act with the "care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing
that a prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character
with like aims."11 3 Courts have held that "the test of prudence the Prudent [Person] Rule - is one of conduct ... not whether his
investment succeeded or failed."11 4 Thus, the prudence standard
considers what a hypothetical prudent fiduciary would do under
comparable circumstances."15 With respect to employee benefit
plan investments, courts have interpreted the prudence
requirement with the "prudent expert" standard - i.e., the
fiduciary must act "as a prudent investment manager under the
modern portfolio theory."" 6 While no one, including fiduciaries,
can predict exactly which investments will out-perform others,
prudence requirements may be met by a process that requires
investments to be examined for appropriate factors such as the
risk of loss, the opportunity for return, diversification, liquidity,
current return, and projected return." 7

112.

See BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE

PRUDENT MAN RULE 3 (1986) (discussing the origins of the prudent man rule).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2008).
114.

See Smith v. Sydnor, 2000 WL 33687953, at *16 (E.D. Va. 2000)

(determining that the Prudent Person Rule analyzes a fiduciary's actions in
selecting a particular investment); Keach, 419 F.3d at 638 (explaining that
ERISA's duty of care obligation "requires prudence, not prescience").
115. Pfeil v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 671 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2012).
The ERISA duty of care further includes procedural prudence - a fiduciary's
prudent investigation and evaluation of a course of action is just as important
as the action taken. See Fink v. Nat'l Say. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 965 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (determining that "[a] fiduciary's independent investigation of the
merits of a particular investment is at the heart of the prudent person
standard."); Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(stating that courts routinely consider a fiduciary's independent investigations
when determining whether or not the fiduciary complied with the prudence
requirement).
116. Enron, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
117. See Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors,
Inc., 173 F.3d 313, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1999) (listing the requirements that a
fiduciary must comply with in order to satisfy the modern portfolio theory).
"[T]he fiduciary must act as though he were a reasonably prudent
businessperson with the interests of all the beneficiaries at heart." Jenkins,
444 F.3d at 924. However, prudence has its limits. In Rogers v. Baxter Int'l,
Inc., 521 F.3d 702, 705-06 (7th Cir. 2008), the plaintiffs alleged that the
pension fiduciaries should never have allowed them to invest in Baxter's stock
because it was overpriced. However, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
"pension fiduciaries [do not] have a duty to outsmart the stock market." Id. at
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Under the modern portfolio theory, fiduciaries are required to
give appropriate consideration to all relevant or material
attributes of an investment, as well as the surrounding facts and
circumstances.118 An investment that is reasonably designed as
part of an overall plan portfolio to further the purposes and
objectives of a plan should not be deemed to be imprudent simply
because the investment, standing alone, would have a relatively
high degree of risk. 19 In addition, under ERISA investing in
employer stock is not considered imprudent without meeting the
burden of establishing a "precipitous decline." 120
However, this does not simply mean that a plan investment
should be deemed prudent solely by reason of the aggregate risk
and return characteristics of the plan's portfolio.121 Rather, a
fiduciary must give "appropriate consideration" to those facts and
circumstances that the fiduciary knows or should know are
relevant to the investment involved, including the role the
investment plays in the plan's investment portfolio.122
Duty for Diversification
A fiduciary must diversify the investments of the plan "so as
to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the
circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so."123 There are three
situations in which the duty to diversify assets is limited: (1) it is
clearly prudent not to do so, (2) when ownership of employer stock
is a principal purpose of the plan (i.e., the plan is an ESOP), and
(3) when participants' direct the investment of their own
accounts.1 24
ERISA does not establish actual percentage limits for plan
investments. 125 In determining whether assets are diversified,
fiduciaries should examine factors such as "(i) the amount of plan
assets; (ii) the cash flow needs of the plan; and (iii) the composition
of the plan's investment portfolio as a whole." 26 Note that EIAPs
3.

706.
118. LaborersNat'l Pension Fund, 173 F.3d at 317-18.
119. See id. at 316 (determining that an investment was not imprudent
simply because when it was viewed in isolation from the portfolio, it resulted
in a $4.2 million loss, when the portfolio, considered as a whole, resulted in a
$18 million gain).
120. See Quan v. Computer Sci. Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2010)
(outlining the factors that plaintiffs need to prove in order to successfully
overcome the presumption that an investment was prudent).
121. See generally Laborers Nat'l. Pension Fund, 173 F.3d at 317-18
(providing multiple factors to consider when determining whether an investor
acted with appropriate consideration, and thus, was prudent).
122. Id.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2008).
124. Xcel, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-76.
125. Wright, 360 F.3d at 1094.
126. Howard Pianko, Elements of ERISA Litigation - Ps, Bs and Other
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are exempt from the diversification requirement. 127
Congress in enacting ERISA, desired to promote employee
ownership.128 Specifically, ERISA expressly exempts pension plan
fiduciaries overseeing company stock plans, like ESOPs or
company stock investment options (401(k)), from any duty to
diversify such investments.129 "In the case of an eligible individual
account plan [like an ESOP or 401(k)], the diversification
requirement .. . and the prudence requirement (only to the extent
that it requires diversification) is not violated by acquisition or
30
holding of . .. qualifying employer securities."

In view of this congressional policy choice, most courts have
applied a presumption of prudence, first adopted by the Third
Circuit in Moench.1a' Under the Moench presumption, a fiduciary
is entitled to a presumption that his decision to invest in the
employer's securities was prudent.132 To defeat the presumption, a
plaintiff must show that "owing to circumstances not known to the
settlor and not anticipated by him [the making of such investment]
would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the
33
purposes of the trust."1
4.

Duty to Follow the Terms of the Plan

ERISA expressly commands fiduciaries to discharge their
duty "in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are
consistent with [ERISA]."134 In other words a fiduciary's adherence
to an ERISA controlled plan "cannot constitute a breach of its
fiduciary duties."135
When plan documents require assets to be invested in
Players, 526 PLI/TAx 197, 219 (2002).
127. Wright, 360 F.3d at 1094.
128. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 425 (6th Cir. 2002).
129. Peabody v. Davis, 636 F.3d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 2011).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2)(2008); see Steinman v. Hicks, 352 F.3d 1101,
1103 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Congress, believing employees' ownership of their
employer's stock a worthy goal, has encouraged the creation of ESOPs both by
giving tax breaks and by waiving the duty ordinarily imposed on trustees by
modern trust law (including ERISA .. .) to diversify the assets of a pension
plan.").
131. Moench, 62 F.3d at 571.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
135. Harris, 302 F.3d at 29; see also Wright, 360 F.3d at 1100 ("ERISA
requires fiduciaries to comply with a plan as written unless it is inconsistent
with ERISA."); White v. Sundstrand Corp., 256 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2001)
("The employer's fiduciary duty, as plan administrator, is to implement
faithfully the provisions of the plan as written."); Sedlack v. Braswell Servs.
Grp., 134 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[A]dherence to an ERISA controlled
plan is not a breach of fiduciary duty.").
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employer stock, courts have recognized the conflict between the
duty to comply with the terms of the plan and the duty to diversify
investments or act prudently. 136 Courts have typically resolved
this conflict by holding that in certain circumstances, the fiduciary
must ignore the terms of the plan regarding investments if the
investments are not prudent. 137 However, where the plan requires
that all assets, not just the majority of assets as in Moench, be
invested in employer stock, at least one court has determined that
the terms of the plan must be followed and that fiduciaries would
not be liable for doing S0.138
III. FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRUDENT PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT

A. The PrudentPortfolio ManagerStandard
ERISA fiduciaries must meet a standard of prudence in
connection to their investment decisions. Specifically, ERISA
fiduciaries are required by statute to act:
With the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise
of a like character and with like aims; and ... by diversifying the
investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses
unless, under the circumstances, it is clearly prudent not to do so. 139
The application of the ERISA prudent person standard to a
plan fiduciary drives to the heart of the legislation. Nonetheless,
on its face, the exact meaning of "prudence" for fiduciaries is
patently ambiguous. Fiduciaries are bound to differ on projections,
risk assessments, and preferred portfolio construction of different
asset classes. 140
In response to such uncertainties related to the prudent
person standard and investment decision making, the DOL has
issued specific regulations that create a framework for ERISA
fiduciaries to follow. Notably, in 2000, the DOL embraced a
quantitative portfolio management strategy known as Modern
136. See generally Moench, 62 F.3d at 569 (conceding that a conflict exists
when a fiduciary is alleged to have violated ERISA by continuing to invest in
an employer's stock).
137. See generally id.; In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Secs. Litig., 86 F.
Supp. 2d 481, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (finding that fiduciaries do not always need

to adhere to the plan).
138. Nelson v. IPALCO Enterprises, Inc., 2003 WL 402253, at *8-9 (S.D.
Ind. 2003).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2008).
140. See generally In re Ford Motor Co. ERISA Litig., 590 F. Supp. 2d 883,
895 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (indicating that there are circumstances in which

reasonable fiduciaries could differ).
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Portfolio Theory ("MPT") through a regulatory safe harbor for
ERISA fiduciaries. 141 MPT, in its most general of terms, looks to
produce an "optimal" portfolio through carefully crafted formulas
intended to enhance portfolio diversification. 14 2 The safe harbor
provides that a fiduciary satisfies ERISA's prudence provision if
the fiduciary:
(i) has given appropriate consideration to those facts and
circumstances that, given the scope of such fiduciary's investment
duties, the fiduciary knows or should know are relevant to the

particular investment or investment course of action involved,
including the role the investment or investment course of action
plays in that portion of the plan's investment portfolio with respect
to which the fiduciary has investment duties; and (ii) has acted
accordingly.1 43
Integral to the DOL's guidance is the meaning of "appropriate
consideration." Appropriate
consideration
or, alternatively,
procedural due diligence means:
A determination by the fiduciary that the particular investment or
investment course of action is reasonably designed, as part of the
portfolio (or, where applicable, that portion of the plan portfolio with

141. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(1) (2000); see also Jenkins, 444 F.3d 916,
925 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that the trustee's initial selection of the plan's
investment funds was consistent with the strategy of finding "long-term,
conservative and reliable investments that would do well during market
fluctuations[|" and that the trustee did not breach his fiduciary duty to
monitor or alter investments when the funds lost value because he regularly
consulted with a financial advisor regarding the funds' performance, and
"investment losses are not proof that an investor violated his duty of care").
When evaluating prudence by continuing to invest in employer stock,
employees' overall retirement packages should also be taken into account. This
is consistent with the modern portfolio theory. Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 633
F.3d 552, 566 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that "[tihe decision of the Plan
fiduciaries . . . to continue offering - as one option - the Motorola Stock Fund

must be evaluated against that backdrop); Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust
Co., 453 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that "it is the riskiness of
one's portfolio, not of a particular asset in the portfolio, that is important to
the risk-averse investor."); see also Nelson, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (S.D. Ind.
2007) (finding that fiduciaries did not imprudently fail to close or divest
company stock fund where participants could choose among an array of
investments); Steinman, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (determining
that the lack of diversification was not imprudent since diversification ran
counter to purpose of ESOP, and stock in acquiring company represented only
portion of plan participants' overall holdings, which also included conventional
defined benefit plan); Hill v. The Tribune Co., 2006 WL 2861016, at *14 (N.D.
Ill. 2006), (noting that "investment risk ... is the key consideration, including
whether the participants' retirement funds are almost entirely invested in the
company's stock or there are other assets besides the company's stock").
142. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. OF FIN. 77-91 (1952).
143. Id.
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respect to which the fiduciary has investment duties), to further the
purposes of the plan, taking into consideration the risk of loss and
the opportunity for gain (or other return) associated with the
144
investment or investment course of action.

On the micro-portfolio

level, the DOL emphasizes that

fiduciaries adopt core MPT principles relating to suggested
portfolio diversification and quantitative risk management.
Fiduciary consideration of the following factors is recommended:
(a) the composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification;
(b) the liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the
anticipated cash flow requirements of the plan; and (c) the
projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives
of the plan. 145
However, there is a conflict among the circuits as to what the
modern portfolio theory really means. The Seventh and Fifth
Circuits and several district courts have held that MPT applies to
the plan's portfolio as a whole. 146 However, the Fourth and the
D.C. Circuits have ruled that MPT alone is not enough and that
prudence of the plan's investment must be judged in isolation.147
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit stated that it "cannot
espouse one particular economic theory over another."1 48 Thus, the
modern portfolio theory is a good start in analyzing a plan's
investments. But clearly, MPT views investments in the
aggregate. Further protection to fiduciaries may be provided by
following the MPT and meeting some additional criteria discussed
later in this Article.

144. Id.
145. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(2)(ii) (2012).
146. Leigh, 858 F.2d at 368 (stating that in determining whether the
fiduciaries acted prudently in creating a diversified portfolio, "it makes sense
for courts to look at the whole portfolio to determine the investment strategy's
success"); Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund, 173 F.3d at 322 (finding that the
district court erroneously judged the challenged investment in isolation
instead of according to the modern portfolio theory required by ERISA policy
as expressed by the Secretary's regulations); Unisys, 1997 WL 732473, at *3
(E.D. Pa 1997) ("The proper inquiry into whether any harm has been suffered
by participants looks to the performance of the portfolio in the aggregate . . .").
147. Modern Portfolio theory, "[s]tanding alone, cannot provide a defense to
the claimed breach of the 'prudent man' duties. . . . 'Under ERISA, the
prudence of investments or classes of investments offered by a plan must be
judged individually."' DiFelice, 497 F.3d at 424. "[O]ur circuit has stated that
'to make prudent investments, the fiduciary has a duty to [research and
analyze] the merits of a particular investment."' Fink, 772 F.2d at 951.
148. Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan v. USX Corp., 900 F. 2d 727, 740
(4th Cir. 1990) ("We cannot discern the approval of only one theory of
valuation in the statutory scheme. Neither can we espouse one particular
economic theory over another.").
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B. A More Extensive Definition of Modern Portfolio Theory

In 1952, economist Harry M. Markowitz changed the theory
and practice of investment management by publishing his
groundbreaking article "Portfolio Selection." 149 Markowitz
designed new quantitative formulas to effectively manage portfolio
risk of loss while at the same time enhancing possible returns for
investors.150

In order to accomplish such ends, Markowitz emphasized that
diversification of the portfolio on the whole was required.
Previously, investment analysts examined portfolio performance
on a security-by-security basis. "[Portfolio] diversification is both
observed and sensible," Markowitz explained. 51 Markowitz based
MPT on the statistical concepts of covariance and correlations.
Covariance measures the relationship between two risky
securities. For example, a high covariance indicates that two
security prices move up or down in a similar manner. A low or
negative covariance indicates that the securities have a lesser
probability of generating similar returns based upon various
market forces. 152
Correlation is another method used to determine how two
securities are related. In addition to providing the level of positive
or negative relation, correlation also provides a numerical value,
which precisely determines the likelihood that assets will move
together in performance based upon previous investment
returns. 153 The basis of MPT is that portfolios should be composed
of assets with low correlation and covariance values. 154 Markowitz
hypothesized that low correlations and covariance results would
produce "efficient" portfolios where the assets would effectively
balance each other out.
Markowitz did not believe in diversification simply for its
premise, but rather, for smart diversification based upon
correlation and covariance algorithms that produced precise
measurements of projected future asset performance. Markowitz's
MPT algorithms could be adjusted based upon the level of desired
investor risk. 155 Through MPT, Markowitz revolutionized the
quantification of portfolio risk and returns. The "goal of portfolio
selection is the construction of portfolios that maximize expected
returns consistent with individually acceptable levels of risk,"
149. Frank J. Fabozzi, Harry M. Markowitz, Peter N. Kolm, and Francis
Gupta, Portfolio Selection, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT, 45-78 (Frank J. Fabozzi & Harry M. Markowitz, eds., 2d ed.).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 77.
152. Id. at 80-81.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 89.
155. Id.
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Markowitz noted.156
Theoretically, MPT leads to the construction of portfolios that
have the greatest expected return for a given level of risk.
Markowitz termed this concept the "efficient portfolio."15 7 Yet, in
practice this is quite an arduous task. Portfolios must be
constructed quantitatively by measuring covariance and
correlation trends among a gigantic number of possible equity and
debt securities. For example, "for a portfolio of just 50 securities,
there are 1,224 covariances that must be measured. For 100
securities, there are 4,950."15s
Subsequent to these calculations, MPT calls for finding the
"optimal portfolio" on an "efficiency frontier." Markowitz defined
the "efficiency frontier" as the portfolio with the greatest expected
return based upon the preferred level of risk or "standard
deviation" value.159 According to Markowitz, rational portfolio
managers would choose the optimal portfolio based upon an
investor's desired risk tolerance. 16 0
Optimal portfolios are selected by fiduciaries without regard
to factors existing outside the portfolio calculations, such as
market risk, long-term liquidity, and other systemic concerns.16 1
The fiduciary duty of procedural due diligence mandates, in part,
that fiduciaries select a portfolio of investments that are optimally
diversified without regard for other macro-economic forces. A 1994
DOL Interpretive ERISA bulletin clarified that "fiduciaries may
never subordinate the economic interests of the plan to unrelated
objectives, and may not select investments on the basis of any
factor outside the economic interest of the plan except in very
limited circumstances.1 62
Rather than taking actual, existing market variables into
account, MPT makes a series of quantitative macro-economic
assumptions, such as (1) investors are rational; (2) market
information is symmetric, available, and cost free; (3) markets are
only temporarily inefficient; and (4) returns follow a normal bell-

156. Id. at 45.
157. Id. at 60-61.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 63.
160. Id.
161. James P. Hawley, Corporate Governance, Risk Analysis, and the
Financial Crisis: Did Universal Owners Contribute to the Crisis, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FAILURES, THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 110 (James P. Hawley, Shyam J. Kamath &
Andrew T. Williams, eds., 2011).
162. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Investing in
Economically Targeted Investments, 73 Fed. Reg. 61, 735 (October 17, 2009);
U.S. Dept. of Labor Advisory Opinion No. 2007-07A (Dec. 21, 2007) and
Advisory Opinion No. 2008-05A (June 27, 2008).
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curve distribution.163
C.

Criticismsof Modern Portfolio Theory and Alternative
Strategies

When markets are liquid and operate efficiently, MPT has the
capacity to produce "optimal" portfolios and, accordingly, discharge
the DOL's fiduciary obligations of "prudence." However, with the
credit crisis in the rearview mirror, there is now growing belief
among economists that MPT might not be the most appropriate
theory for fiduciary portfolio management.
In a recent article entitled Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty

Balance, authors James Hawley, Keith Johnson, and Ed Waitzer
wrote that an "adjustment" to MPT is "likely" to occur based upon
proven shortcomings with the investment philosophy. 164 The
authors primarily rest their argument on four premises: (1) the
growth of exotic synthetic financial instruments has led to the
mispricing of market credit, liquidity, and operational risk; (2)
major institutional investor adoption of MPT has produced returns
that are extrinsically linked, resulting in investment "herding"
and market inefficiency; (3) MPT's sweeping unrealistic
assumptions regarding investor risk aversion are not always
appropriate; and (4) that MPT neglects to consider the potential
extraordinary impact of systemic risk on the liquidity of a given
investment portfolio. 165
Certainly, the widespread adoption of speculative synthetic
derivative products and their inclusion in plan asset portfolios
creates inefficiencies in Markowitz's MPT. It is far more difficult to
craft accurate correlations between synthetic derivative assets
than it is to gauge how two equity securities or generic corporate
bonds will move in price against each other. Synthetic security
returns are strongly affected by latent and uncertain future
market risk.166
When market risk becomes uncertain, MPT correlations may
tend to skewer from projected price movement. As a result, MPT
efficiency trees then become unrealistic projections of the greatest
possible return for fiduciary portfolios. Moreover, as previously
noted, MPT narrowly confines its risk scope to a single portfolio. It
does not consider potential market effects of cumulative fiduciary
adoption. 6 7 The potential "herding" effect among large
institutional plans results in the implementation of identical
investment strategies and undermines the predictive power of
163. James Hawley, Keith Johnson, and Ed Waitzer, Reclaiming Fiduciary
Duty Balance, 4 ROTMAN INT'L J. PENSION MGMT. 4-5 (2011).
164. Id. at 5.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 110.
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MPT.168
MPT also relies upon the efficient market hypothesis
("EMH"). EMH assumes that market information is readily
available and used rationally by market participants to create a
daily market price. 6 9 The MPT presumption is that markets are
stable and only temporarily inefficient.170 Yet, the credit crisis
proved that over reliance upon MPT and the EMH be damaging
for asset managers because these model distributions failed to
account for "fat tail" stress scenarios. "Fat tail" events are
economic scenarios that are severe and potentially cataclysmic.
During the credit crisis, for instance, market saturation of
speculation and default insurance resulted in extreme volatility
that the MPT model was unable to predict. In short, MPT did not
account for the variable of systemic risk.171
Recently, new investment management paradigms have
emerged that seek to address the perceived one-size-fits-all nature
of MPT investing and the inability to account for "fat tail"
distributions.172 For example, leading economists at the EDHEC
Business School and Risk Institute advocate for the construction of
a "customized liability hedging portfolio" ("LHP") and a
"performance seeking approach" ("PSP").173 The sole purpose of the
LHP would be to "hedge away as effectively as possible the impact
of unexpected changes in risk factors" and provide investors with
an optimal risk-return trade off.174
In February 2012, Harvard University Senior Research
Fellow Steve Lydenberg in his research paper, Reason, Rationality
and Fiduciary Duty17' also has addressed various purported
inadequacies of MPT. Lydenberg echoed the "herding" criticism of
MPT by explaining that "Modern Portfolio Theory has directed
fiduciaries to act rationally - that is, in the sole financial
interests of their funds - downplaying the effects of their
investments on others." 76
168. Id.
169. Id. at 111.
170. Id.
171. Id.at 111-12.
172. Noel Amenc, Felix Goltz, Lionel Martellini, and Vincent Milhau, Asset
Allocation and Portfolio Construction, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT159-202 (Frank J. Fabozzi & Harry M. Markowitz,
eds., 2d ed. 2011).
173. Id. at 160.
174. Id.
175. Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., IRRC Inst. Announces Two
$10,000 Awards for Best Research on Post-Modern Portfolio Theory (Feb. 21,
2012), http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdfIRRC-Award-WinnersFeb-21-2012.pdf.
176. Steve Lydenberg, Reason, Rationality and FiduciaryDuty, INITL4TIVE
FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY 2 (Jan. 2012),
http://hausercenter.org/irilwp-content/uploads/2010/05/Reason-Rationalityand-Fiduciary-Duty.pdf.
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Lydenberg concluded that fiduciary decisions based upon
subjective
reason only
formulas,
without
mathematical
exacerbates the potentiality of "fat tails" and systemic risk. He
explained that "[a]s increasing numbers of passive index investors
enter the markets they encourage a blind 'herding' behavior that
exacerbates the bubbles and bursts created by the speculators who
are increasingly left to set prices in the markets." 7 7
Rather than clinging to MPT quantitative rationality, the
importance of fiduciary reasonability and a "conception of
prudence characterized by wisdom, discretion and intelligence" is
8
what should drive fiduciary decisions, according to Lydenberg. 7
In his award-winning research paper, he criticizes fiduciary
reliance upon mathematical algorithms and formulas that fail to
take into account market uncertainty. Academic economists with a
mathematical bent, rather than legal scholars or financial
professionals, laid the groundwork for MPT, substituting risk
control at a portfolio level for specific, judgment-based security
selection as the basis for prudent investment. 79
In looking towards the future, Lydenberg examined three new
corporate governance paradigms that are intended to supplement
arguable inadequacies of MPT selection:
(1) the universal owner approach, i.e., concern about the effect of

[fiduciary] investments on the whole economy [increases returns for
plan assets because investments will not perform unless the macro
economy performs].
(2) the sustainable or responsible investment approach, i.e., concern

about the effect of [fiduciary] investments on the quality of the
environment and society in which their current and future
beneficiaries live [is vital to maintain long-term positive returns].
(3) the broad-based-norms approach, i.e., concern that [fiduciary]

investments be consistent with certain universally recognized norms
and standards that are associated with [corporate] governance [are
integral to consistent portfolio returns].180
Lydenberg writes that, in practical application, these three
paradigms have been implemented in various institutional
measures. For instance, the "universal approach" was adopted in
recent decisions by the California Public Employees Retirement
System to invest $800 million in infrastructure projects, by TIAACREF to invest $50 million with Good Energies Inc., and by J.P.
Morgan, The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, The Gatsby
Charitable Foundation, and The Rockefeller Foundation to invest
cooperatively $25 million in an African Agricultural Capital Fund
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 11.
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managed by Pearl Capital Partners. 18 1
The sustainable approach was accepted by institutional
European funds such as the Norway Government Pension, when
in 2011 they eliminated from their portfolio "nine companies
involved in creating severe environmental damage and 17
companies involved in the production of tobacco products."1 82
Lydenberg also notes that the U.K. pension fund managers
Universities Superannuation Scheme, the Hermes Fund
Managers, and the Dutch pension fund managers APG and PGGM
are among the investors in the Access to Medicines Index, which
ranks pharmaceutical companies on their efforts to provide access
to medicine to impoverished communities. 183
Finally, Lydenberg noted that SNS Asset Management, a
Dutch based asset manager, has adopted the "broad-based
approach" and financial services company SNS REAAL, with over
C50 billion under management, employs a number of social and
environmental principles in its fundamental investment policies
including an emphasis on "human rights, child and forced labor,
systems,
and
environmental
controversial
weapons
contamination."18 4
Apart from enhancing fiduciary consideration of governance
and corporate social responsibility, Lydenberg emphasized that
fiduciaries should embrace known economic convention when
making investment decisions. This requires the opposite of
deference to quantitative MPT models. Indeed, to combat
uncertainty and systemic risk, Lydenberg contended that
fiduciaries should rely upon their own wisdom from known
"conventions," in other words, practical common sense.185
Lydenberg advocated that a range of factors beyond narrow
financial criteria should supplement fiduciary investment decision
making, including the "sustainability of society" and the "stability
of financial markets"186 - in essence, combining MPT rationality
with a humanistic risk management standard.
D. Where Do We Go from Here?
Stand-alone fiduciary reliance upon MPT is a good start, but
adding protection would entail tweaking the investment
philosophy to the current economic climate. As stated above,
ERISA § 404 fiduciary requirements mandate appropriate
diversification and minimization of large portfolio losses. MPT is a
safe risk adverse means to invest plan asset funds. However, in
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 12.
at 15.
at 15-16.
at 16.
at 32.
at 33.
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implementation, analyzing the current economic environment
would further assist in minimizing plan losses.
While the previously prudent fiduciary had good reason to
rely on MPT, financial times have changed. The current trend is
towards rational quantitative adjustments to MPT. For example,
the EDEC method calls for a hedged portfolio to account for
potentially bad investments and market risks. Moreover,
supplementation of MPT with notions of social responsibility,
governance, and accepted economic and societal conventions is also
gaining popularity, especially in European circles. Taking the
foregoing into account, the DOL MPT safe harbor is ripe for
modification to assist and provide guidance to fiduciaries in
meeting their duties under ERISA.
IV. DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN INVESTMENTS IN EMPLOYER
STOCK

A. Employer Stock JurisprudenceCreatedfrom Trial Court
Decisions
As mentioned previously, most cases involving allegations of
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA for maintaining employer
stock have been adjudicated in the motion to dismiss and
summary judgment stages, and thereafter have usually settled.
Thus, only a handful of employee stock fiduciary cases have gone
to trial. While the factual scenarios may be different, these cases
generally favor a presumption of prudence for the employer
fiduciary, or at least a high burden of proof to support an
allegation that the fiduciary breached his duties in continuing to
invest in employer stock.
In the first case that went to trial, Landgraff v.
Columbia/HCA, a Tennessee district court addressed whether the
defendant fiduciaries were both procedurally and substantively
prudent. 18 7 The company at issue, Columbia/HCA, was a health
care management firm, which owned and operated approximately
300 hospitals throughout the United States.188 Former employees
and participants in the company's ESOP known as the Stock
Bonus Plan ("SBP"), Landgraff and Magarian, sued claiming that
the defendant fiduciaries were not procedurally or substantively
prudent in overseeing the SBP, which qualified as an EIAP as
defined under 29 U.S.C.

§ 1107 (d)(3)(A).189

In Columbia/HCA, the plaintiffs were participants in a stock
bonus plan and 401(k) plan that invested in employer stock, and
the value of their plan accounts decreased as a result of federal
187. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 2000 WL 33726564, at *19.
188. Id. at *1.
189. Id. at *1-2.
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government investigations of the company's Medicare billing
practices. 190 After discussing the committee meetings and the
committee's continued determination that the employer stock was
still a prudent plan investment, the court determined there was no
breach of fiduciary duty because the plaintiffs did not establish
that a reasonable fiduciary would have determined that the
investment of the plan assets in Columbia/HCA stock was
imprudent, thereby rebutting the presumption of reasonableness
afforded to defendants' actions. 191 The court noted that based on
the facts, "an inquiry into the fundamentals of the company would
not have revealed to a reasonable fiduciary that the investment at
issue was improvident."192 In addition, the court found that the
company itself was not liable based on an alleged failure to
monitor and remove the committee members.193
However, despite adopting the Moench presumption as the
appropriate standard of review, the court found the defendant
fiduciaries to be procedurally imprudent.19 4 Essentially, this
determination was made because under the plain language of the
SBP "investment guidelines" the defendant fiduciaries were
required to consider whether "at certain times additional assets
may be added to the portfolio to dampen the volatility of Employer
Common Stock without severely damaging the Employee's ability
to participate in the growth of the Employer Common Stock." 195
The defendant fiduciaries did not consider these stated
diversification requirements, and as a result, the court ruled they
failed to meet their procedural requirement of prudence.1 96
Nonetheless, the court held that the plaintiffs could not
establish substantive imprudence.197 The court ruled that there
was no casual link between the procedural deficiency and the
harm suffered by the plan because the company's financials were
strong, according to internal and external reports. 198 Two years
later, the Sixth Circuit likewise found no substantive breach of
fiduciary duty in portfolio investments based upon the facts
presented. 99
In DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, the ERISA allegations stemmed
from the U.S. Airways bankruptcy, specifically involving the
company's many diversified portfolio funds as well as a U.S.

190. Id. at *1.
191. Id. at *19.
192. Id. at *16.
193. Id. at *19.
194. Id. at *14.
195. Id. at *3.
196. Id. at *13.
197. Id. at *19.
198. Id. at *14-17.
199. Landgraff v. Columbia, 30 Fed. App'x. 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2002).

2012]

The Correct Standardof Prudence

579

Airways Company stock fund. 200 In affirming the lower court's
holding that there was no breach of the fiduciary duty of
procedural or substantive prudence, the Fourth Circuit
emphasized that the plaintiffs had an "almost unlimited ability to
allocate their investments" because of the diversity of 401(k) plan
options offered to them. 201 In fact, since U.S. Airways offered such
a diverse plethora of 401(k) plan investment options, the court
noted, "in this way, the onus was on the participants to manage
their investments."202

The plan did impose certain restrictions on the participants'
ability to invest in the company stock fund. 203 For example,
"matched" contributions provided by U.S. Airways were not
permitted to be invested in the company stock fund. 204 A
participant who removed his or her investment from the company
stock fund could not reinvest in the fund until thirty calendar days
later. 205 Moreover, U.S. Airways provided a Summary Plan
Document ("SPD"), which provided general information and
descriptions of investment options, as well as important warnings
regarding the company stock fund including a clear disclaimer
that U.S. Airways could not guarantee its performance. 206
In its review of the facts presented, the Fourth Circuit held
that the defendant fiduciaries met their duties of procedural
prudence because of the existence of the SPD and its myriad of
disclosures and warnings regarding the company stock fund,
regular meetings regarding the sustainability of the company
stock fund, appointment of an independent fiduciary, and good
faith belief in the legitimacy of the U.S. Airways restructuring
plan to stave off bankruptcy. 207
With regard to the impact of an independent fiduciary's
appointment on procedural prudence the court indicated that
"although appointment of an independent fiduciary does not
'whitewash' a prior fiduciary's actions, timely appointment of an
independent fiduciary, prompted by concerns about the continued
prudence of holding company stock under an ERISA plan, does
provide some evidence of 'procedural' prudence and proper
monitoring during the relevant period."208
Fiduciary prudence was met in U.S. Airways because those
fiduciaries were active, engaged, and advised participants of their

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

DiFelice,497 F.3d at 413-15.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 414-15.
Id. at 414 n.1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 421.
Id.
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options without ignoring plan mandates or any other 401(k)
diversification requirements. The fiduciaries reasonably believed
at the time that their restructuring program would work and that
the company stock was a viable investment for the airline
company's employees. 209 The Fourth Circuit did not discuss the
applicability of the Moench presumption in this case.
The Seventh Circuit addressed similar prudence issues in the
case Nelson v. Hodowal.210 Indianapolis Power and Light Company
("IPALCO") employees brought an action arising out of a
precipitous drop in the company's stock - from $49.60 to $4.11 in a
matter of months - after IPALCO merged with AES Corporation
in 2001.211 IPALCO maintained a defined benefit 401(k) plan and
a defined contribution plan. 212 The defined benefit plan held a
diversified portfolio and the defined contribution plan initially
included only company stock where the employer matched these
contributions up to four percent of an employee's annual salary. 213
Upon consummation of the merger IPALCO shares were sold to
AES and the defined contribution plan participants received AES
stock. 214 The pension committee believed at the time of the merger
that the AES deal held better long-term options for IPALCO plan
participants. 215
From the plan's inception, IPALCO hired Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., to advise the participants about
appropriate plan investments. 216 The record indicated that Merrill
Lynch emphasized to the participants the benefits of
diversification and, subsequent to the merger, it widely distributed
literature advising participants of their new options with
appropriate disclosures and warnings. 217 Nonetheless, the
plaintiffs alleged that the fiduciaries should have predicted the
extreme decline in stock and, thus, were neither procedurally nor
substantively prudent in exercising their obligations. 218
While the IPALCO-defined contribution plan required the
pension committee to maintain IPALCO stock as an option, the
district court held that "a number of court decisions have
recognized at least a possibility that, under sufficiently dire
circumstances, ERISA fiduciaries' duty of prudence may require
them to act contrary to the terms of the plan and sell employer

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 422.
Nelson, 512 F.3d at 347.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 347.
Id.
Nelson, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
Id. at 1077.
Nelson, 512 F.3d at 348.
Nelson, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.
Hodowall, 512 F.3d at 349.
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stock."219 Moreover, the fact that the condition of both the IPALCO
and AES stocks were "reasonably healthy ... weigh[ed] heavily
against a finding of breach of fiduciary duty."220 In holding that
the Moench presumption was applicable, the district court stated:
With or without the [Moench] presumption ... it is clear that
the defendants here all viewed continued investments in IPALCO
and AES as an appropriate and suitable investment option for the
thrift plan participants. The Defendants had reasonable grounds
for that view after going through the process that led the IPALCO
board to approve the AES Share exchange. 221
Specifically, the district court relied upon the IPALCO
pension committee and board of directors' diligent research into
the health of AES and its long-term viability. 222 The IPALCO
board was substantively and procedurally prudent because it took
many steps to ensure, in its own good faith, that the merger with
AES was in the best interest of the plan participants and the
company as a whole. 223 There was "no non-public information
224
indicating that AES stock was likely to decline in value."
Further, the district court asserted that even if the defendant
fiduciaries were found to be procedurally deficient, this "would not
have resulted in the removal of IPALCO/AES as investment
options," i.e., the causation necessary for a showing of a breach of
substantive prudence. 225 Indeed, on review in the Seventh Circuit,
226
the court affirmed this holding without modification or criticism.
Like U.S. Airways, the IPALCO case demonstrates that
application of the Moench presumption is inconsequential so long
as the defendant fiduciaries make good faith reasonable decisions
that they believe at the time are in the best interests of the plan
participants. Courts assume a deferential analysis and are
reluctant to be critical of decisions they believe may be imprudent
with the added benefit of hindsight.
Finally, the most recently tried employer stock case, Brieger
v. Tellabs, Inc., is yet another example of a court deferring to a
fiduciary's good faith investigation and reasonable belief in the
a
was
Tellabs
decisions. 227
investment
of
soundness
telecommunications company that provided two retirement plans:
a savings plan and profit sharing plan.228 "An employee could elect
to make contributions to the savings portion of the plan, which
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Nelson, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
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Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1099-1100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Nelson, 512 F.3d at 351.
Brieger, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 852.
Id.
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Tellabs matched in an amount up to three percent of the
employee's income." 229 Each individual employee had the authority
to allocate his or her investments among eleven or twelve different
investment choices. 230 One fund consisted solely of Tellabs stock. 231
"The Tellabs stock fund was the only single-security investment
offered to the plan participants." 232
In an effort to provide investment education, Tellabs
employees were warned about holding company stock, had access
to extensive information about how the company was performing,
other investment disclosures, and quarterly statements. 233 Indeed,
employees had access to a Tellabs intranet website that contained
numerous news articles about the company, a daily update of its
stock price, and links to websites where participants could review
and alter their investment choices in the plan. 23 4
At issue in the case was the prudence of the defendant
fiduciaries in failing to remove Tellabs stock as an investment
option during the class period when the value dropped from $63.19
to $6.58 per share. The plaintiffs argued that the plan documents
did not require the defendant fiduciaries to offer Tellabs stock as
an investment option. 235
As a preliminary matter, the district court found that while
the plan "granted defendants the power to evaluate and terminate
'Funds,' it specifically stated that a Fund comprised of Tellabs
stock was required to be maintained and offered to Plan
participants." 236 The court held that the plaintiff could not prove
that the defendant was procedurally and substantively imprudent
in failing to remove Tellabs as an investment option because of
market conditions. The court reasoned that the Tellabs fiduciaries
did not have to hold formal discussions regarding the utility of
retaining the company stock as an investment option to satisfy
procedural requirements. Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs could
show procedural imprudence, the court indicated "a reasonably
prudent individual in similar circumstances who undertook such
an examination would not have sold the plan's Tellabs stock or
removed it as an investment option. The fact that the stock price
dropped significantly during the class period is not, on its own,
conclusive." 237 Like the aforementioned cases, the court instructed
that instead of basing imprudence claims on dips in the stock price

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 853.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 855.
236. Id. at 861.
237. Id. at 862-63.
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or troubled company claims, it is imperative to remove hindsight
from the analysis and simply determine what "reasonably prudent
fiduciaries would have done based on the information available at
the time."238 Critical to the court's decision was that the defendant
fiduciaries presented "ample evidence" that Tellabs's business
prospects in the short term and long term would recover. 239
Like in IPALCO and U.S. Airways, the defendant fiduciaries
had good reason to believe that their decision-making in periods of
market turmoil would not require dilution of the plans
investments. Clearly, the aforementioned cases illustrate that
whether the Moench presumption is applied or not, ERISA
plaintiffs must demonstrate some form of scienter evidence among
defendant fiduciaries that they knew their investment decisions
were not in the best interests of the plan, or alternatively, as in
Columbia/HCA, that they ignored plan mandates of
diversification or other equally as important requirements.
In conclusion, in the stock drop cases that have gone to trial,
the courts have refused to impute the benefit of hindsight and
crystal ball predictions when reviewing the prudence of the
defendant fiduciaries. Instead, such fiduciary prudence is weighed
based on the information available during the respective class
period. 240 Such costly litigation, in light the fiduciaries' heavy
burden, further supports the need to afford fiduciaries with a
presumption of prudence.
B.

The Presumptionof Prudence Standard

1. Evolution of the Presumptionin Employer Stock Cases
In the earlier stock drop cases, courts generally recognized
claims for breach of fiduciary duty for continued investment in
employer stock of decreasing value. However, courts seemed
reluctant to apply fiduciary liability to board members absent an
active role in the plan administration.
In Eaves v. Penn,241 the court determined that a cause of
action for investing an ESOP in employer stock that declined in

238. Id. at 863.
239. Id. at 864.
240. See Kuper, 852 F. Supp. at 1399 ("By enacting ERISA with specific
exemptions for ESOPs, Congress signaled its conviction that ESOP
investment in employer stock is a desirable practice that should be
encouraged. This Court will not assume that Congress thereby intended to
foist upon ESOP fiduciaries the additional duty of clairvoyance."); Kirschbaum
v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 256 (5th Cir. 2008) ("A fiduciary cannot
be placed in the untenable position of having to predict the future of the
company stock's performance."); DiFelice, 497 F.3d 410, 424 (4th Cir. 2007)
("whether a fiduciary's actions are prudent cannot be measured in hindsight").
241. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 460 (10th Cir. 1978).
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value was valid. 242 However, the director that was liable was also
the plan trustee and the decline in value was partially due to his
transaction with the ESOP and his "mismanagement of the
company." 243 The facts showed that he was using the plan for his
own benefit, i.e., he was using his role as trustee to acquire all the
legal title to the company's stock and control of the company. 244
The director's first defense was that, as director, he was not a
"fiduciary." The court rejected this because he was also the plan
trustee and it was clear he was exercising discretionary control
over the plan. Next, the director argued that, as trustee, he was
bound by the terms of the plan to invest in the company's stock.
The court rejected this reasoning based on the statutory language
and said that there was no such exception to the "exclusive
benefit" and "prudent man" requirements of ERISA 404(a)(1)). 24 5
The plaintiffs in Fink v. National Savings and Trust
Company246 also brought an action against the plan trustees for
investing too much of the plan's assets in employer stock. 247
Apparently, the company amended the terms of the plan and trust
to require that all assets be invested in company stock. 248 The plan
borrowed funds to purchase employer stock and used company
contributions to make loan payments. 249 When the company
experienced a "serious downturn due to the loss of their largest
customer," the company could not make contributions to the plan
and the plan could therefore not make payments on the note or
pay benefits when due. 250 Although the plaintiffs claimed that the
trustees breached their fiduciary duties by "acquiring and
retaining" employer stock, the primary issues related to the
prudence of the plan's leverage transaction rather than the value
of the stock itself. 251 The court determined that the plaintiffs'
claims were not time barred and remanded the case. 252
In Canale v. Yegan, 253 the defendants were D & Os and also
"plan administrators," although there is little discussion in the
case of what administrative functions the defendants had as plan
administrators. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged
in misbehavior, mismanagement of companies, and fraudulent
concealment of facts, which resulted in a decline in the value of the
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 460.
Fink, 772 F.2d at 955.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 954.

249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 956.
252. Id. at 958.
253. Canale v. Yegan, 782 F. Supp. 963, 966 (D.N.J. 1992).
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company's stock.254 After noting the special status of an ESOP and
its primary investment in employer securities, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs stated a valid "failure to diversify plan asset"
claim under ERISA:
[U]nder these circumstances, where plaintiffs have alleged that the
value of the plan's investment was impaired by the plan fiduciaries'
own fraudulent and illegal acts, allegations of failure to diversify
plan assets invested in an ESOP can state a claim under ERISA....
[T]he basis for this ERISA action is not the perpetration of the fraud
on Integrity's shareholders itself, but the fact that, knowing the
Plan's investment had been impaired by their own fraudulent acts,
defendants, acting as fiduciaries, failed to take any steps to protect
the Plan's assets from dissipation.255

In Kuper v. Quantum Chemical Corporation,256 the court
granted summary judgment for the company and board members
in an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit where the value of
the stock declined during an eighteen-month period before the
plan assets were transferred to a new plan. 257 Although the court
recognized that board members could be fiduciaries under ERISA
if they have the power to appoint plan administrators, it
determined that the plaintiffs in that case "failed to come forward
with specific facts showing that that there [was] a genuine issue as
to whether the defendants were fiduciaries in pertinent
respects." 258 The court found that the company and the board were
not named fiduciaries under the plan and did not, under the terms
of the plan, have discretionary authority over the management,
administration, or assets of the plan. 259 Although the plaintiffs
claimed they had a "reasonable suspicion" that the board
influenced the committee's decisions, the court held that the
plaintiffs failed to articulate specific facts to support that
contention. 260 Therefore, since the plaintiffs did not allege that the
company and its board breached a duty with respect to the
appointment and removal of plan administrators, and did not
allege that the company or board knew of any wrongdoing by the
plan administrators, summary judgment was appropriate. 261 Thus,
only one of these early employer stock drop cases denied board
members' motions for summary judgment. 262
254. Id.
255. Id. at 968.
256. Kuper, 838 F. Supp. 342, 344.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 348.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. McKinnon v. Cairns, 698 F. Supp. 852, 860 (W.D. Okla. 1988) ("While

plaintiffs do not allege any discretionary authority or responsibility of [the
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2. The Presumptionof Prudence as Applied to EIAPs
At the same time, to encourage employee ownership through
pension plans and to give workers a long-term stake in the
enterprise for which they labor, 263 Congress expressly allows EIAP
fiduciaries to concentrate the plan's holdings in employer
securities, by exempting such plans from the diversification
requirement and from the prudence requirement, insofar as it
encompasses duties related to diversification.26 4 Congress intended
ERISA to balance the protection of employee benefits against
creating a system "so complex that administrative costs, or
litigation expenses, unduly discouraged employers from offering
[pension] benefit plans in the first place." 265 In the context of
EIAPs, "Congress has expressed a strong preference for plan
investment in the employer's stock, although this preference may
be in tension with ERISA's general fiduciary duties."266
In determining whether a fiduciary acted prudently in
continuing to offer company stock as an investment option, "[t]he
focus of the inquiry is how the fiduciary acted, not whether his
investments succeeded or failed." 267 A fiduciary's conduct must be

individual directors] in the administration of the plans, this allegation can be
inferred from the Complaint. The question whether all or any of these
defendants exercised such control sufficient to establish them as ERISA
fiduciaries is a factual one, and will be borne out through evidence, or the lack
thereof, presented following discovery.")
263. Foltz, 865 F.2d at 373 (explaining that "ERISA ... specifically favors"
capital structures involving "long-term employee ownership").
264. See Kirschbaum, 526 F.3d at 249 ("ERISA exempts an EIAP from the
duty to diversify with regard to the purchase or holding of company stock.");
Steinman, 352 F.3d at 1103 ("Congress, believing employees' ownership of
their employer's stock a worthy goal, has encouraged the creation of ESOPs
both by giving tax breaks and by waiving the duty ordinarily imposed on
trustees by modern trust law (including ERISA ...) to diversify the assets of a
pension plan."). As one court reasoned:
If there is no duty to diversify ESOP plan assets under the statute, it
logically follows that there can be no claim for breach of fiduciary duty
arising out of a failure to diversify, or in other words, arising out of
allowing the plan to become heavily weighted in company stock.
In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. ERISA Litig., 2002 WL 31431588, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
Despite the risks inherent in concentrating plan assets in any one security,
the express statutory exemption of the diversification duty in relation to an
employer's stock holdings precludes recovery. Kirschbaum, 526 F.3d at 249;
see In re Dell, Inc. ERISA Litig., 563 F. Supp. 2d 681, 687 (W.D. Tex. 2008)
(dismissing diversification claim because "EIAP fiduciaries do not have a duty
to diversify and do not act imprudently by not diversifying the assets of an
EIAP.").
265. Kirschbaum, 526 F.3d at 253.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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evaluated "in light of the character and aims of the particular type
of plan he serves."268 For pension plans invested in company stock,
the court should consider the "long-term horizon of retirement
investing" as well as the "favored status Congress has granted to
employee stock investments in their own companies." 269
Attempting to strike the proper balance between these
competing interests, the Third Circuit adopted an abuse of
discretion standard of review for assessing fiduciary prudence in
the context of ESOPs or other EIAPs. 270 An EIAP fiduciary who
invests the assets in employer stock is entitled to a presumption
that it acted consistently with ERISA in making that decision." 271
The Moench standard has been expressly adopted by the Second,
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. Certain districts courts
have also applied the presumption in circuits not expressly
adopting it.272 The latest circuit to adopt the Moench presumption
stated that by not affording the fiduciaries this presumption of
prudence, it would "force ESOP fiduciaries to choose between the
devil and the deep blue sea."273
In Moench, the Third Circuit concluded that an ESOP
fiduciary is entitled to a presumption that his decision to invest in
the employer's securities was prudent and that a plaintiff may
268. Id. at 253-54.
269. Id. at 254.
270. See Moench, 62 F.3d at 571 (discussing ESOPs); Edgar v. Avaya, Inc.,
503 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2007) (extending Moench to EIAPs).
271. Moench, 62 F.3d at 571. In that case, the court developed a "prudence
presumption" that a fiduciary "who invests the assets in employer stock is
entitled to a presumption that it acted consistently with ERISA by virtue of
that decision. Id. However, the plaintiff may overcome that presumption by
establishing that the fiduciary abused its discretion by investing in employer
securities." Id. To rebut the prudence presumption, a plaintiff must establish
that continued investment in employer stock would "defeat or substantially
impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust." Id.
272. Lalonde, 369 F.3d at 6; Bunch v. W.R. Grace & Co., 555 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 2009); Stein, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 168; Kennet v. State St. Corp., 694 F.
Supp. 2d 283, 299 (D. Mass. 2008); Coffin v. Bowater, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 38,
47 (D. Maine 2005); DiFelice,497 F.3d at 417; Duke, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 795; In
re Wachovia Corp. ERISA Litig., 2010 WL 3081359, at *8-12 (W.D.N.C. 2010);
In re Constellation Energy Grp., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 602, 614 (D. Md. 2010);
Pugh v. Tribune, 521 F.3d 686, 696 (7th Cir. 2008); Steinman, 252 F. Supp. 2d
at 758; Harzewski v. Guidant, 489 F.3d 799, 810 (7th Cir. 2007); Summers,
453 F.3d at 412; Howell v. Motorola, 633 F.3d 552, 571 (7th Cir. 2011);
Armstrong v. LaSalle Bank, 446 F.3d 728, 740 (7th Cir. 2006); Brieger, 629 F.
Supp. 2d at 872; Peabody v. Davis, 636 F.3d 368, 385 (7th Cir. 2011); Nelson,
480 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (S.D. Ind. 2007); In re Harley-Davidson, Inc. Secs.
Litig., 660 F. Supp. 2d 953, 967 (E.D. Wis. 2009); Sears, 2004 WL 407007, at
*3; Brown v. Medtronic, 628 F.3d 451, 459 (8th Cir. 2010); Xcel, 312 F. Supp.
2d at 1180; Morrison v. Moneygrams Interns, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1045
(D. Minn. 2009); Crocker v. KV Pharms., 782 F. Supp. 2d 760, 780 (E.D. Mo.
2010).
273. Lanfear v. Home Depot, 2012 WL 1580614, at *10 (11th Cir. 2012).
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rebut the presumption only by showing that "owing to
circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him
[that the making of such investment] would defeat or substantially
impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust."274
The strength of the presumption depends on other factors,
such as the amount of discretion given to the fiduciary under the
terms of the plan or any conflicts of interests the fiduciary may
have. 275 The Second Circuit in Citigroup also adopted this sliding
scale, stating that "[a] fiduciary's failure to divest from company
stock is less likely to constitute an abuse of discretion if the plan's
terms require - rather than merely permit - investment in

Company stock." 276
Given the presumption of prudence to which ERISA
fiduciaries are entitled, plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to
show what "circumstances not known to the settlor and not
anticipated by him" should have caused the EIAP fiduciary to
determine that employer stock was not a prudent investment. 277 In
other words, plaintiffs must, at a minimum, allege what caused
stock to become an imprudent investment. 278
For example, in Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., the
plaintiff alleged that the stock became an imprudent investment
when the fiduciaries obtained adverse information about improper
trading by a few employees and the stock dropped in value by forty
percent. 279 However, the Kirschbaum court found that these
allegations were insufficient to overcome the presumption of
prudence.280

Thus, Kirschbaum demonstrates that the Moench
presumption may be overcome only where the employer's financial

274. Moench, 62 F.3d at 571 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 227 cmt. g (1959)); see Dell, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 691-93 (stating that the
Moench presumption of prudence applies regardless of whether the "plan
requires, encourages, or permits investment [in employer stock] so long as the
investment is an EIAP or ESOP" and may be applied at the motion to dismiss
stage).
275. Quan, 623 F.3d at 883; Kirschbaum, 526 F.3d at 255.
276. Citigroup,662 F.3d at 137.
277. Dell, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
278. Kirschbaum, 526 F.3d at 253-55.
279. Id. at 255.
280. Id.; see also Wright, 360 F.3d at 1098 (noting the ill-fated merger,
reverse stock split, and seventy five percent drop in stock price were
insufficient to rebut the Moench presumption of prudence); Kuper, 66 F.3d at
1459 (noting the company-wide financial woes and eighty percent drop in
stock price were insufficient); In re Avon Prods., Inc., Secs. Litig., 2009 WL
884687, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that the twenty four percent drop in
stock price and declining sales were insufficient); McKesson, 391 F. Supp. 2d
at 830-33 (declining to apply Moench, but concluding widespread accounting
violations, restated revenues for three years, and seventy five percent drop in
stock price were insufficient to rebut presumption).
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circumstances are so dismal that continued investment in
employer stock would impress upon participants extraordinary
risks - risks that go beyond what Congress contemplated when it
endorsed in ERISA long-term investments in employer securities
through the creation of EIAPs. 281
3.

"PrecipitousDecline" and "on the Brink of Collapse"

Moench and its progeny stand for the proposition that an
EIAP's fiduciaries must sell employer securities in contravention
of plan terms only "where a company's financial situation is
seriously deteriorating and there is a genuine risk of insider selfdealing." 282 Plaintiffs must allege facts showing gravely dire

281. Wright, 360 F.3d at 1098 (affirming grant of 12(b)(6) motion and
holding that the presumption of prudence "may be overcome when a
precipitous decline in the employer's stock is combined with evidence that the
company is on the brink of collapse or undergoing serious mismanagement").
The Third Circuit in Moench addressed claims brought against the fiduciaries
of a plan sponsored by a bank that failed and went into bankruptcy. Moench,
62 F.3d at 572. The plan's fiduciaries were members of the sponsoring bank's
board of directors, and in the year preceding the bankruptcy, had inside, nonpublic "knowledge of [the company's] impending collapse" by virtue of being
privy to the fact that federal bank examiners had found "violations of law and
regulation ... across a number of areas in the [company's] subsidiary banks,"
and had found "unsafe and unsound credit practices," a "rapid deterioration in
the quality of the loan portfolio," and other harbingers of imminent disaster.
Id. Despite this intimate knowledge of an expected rapid deterioration in the
fundamentals of the company and a downward trend in the price of the
securities, the plan fiduciaries continued investing plan assets in employer
stock while the collapse of the company appeared increasingly imminent. Id.
Given both the quantum and content of the information then known to the
fiduciaries, the Third Circuit remanded the case to allow plaintiffs to pursue
their claim that the fiduciaries "properly could effectuate the purposes of the
trust only by deviating from the trust's direction." Id.; see also Duke, 281 F.
Supp. 2d at 795 (applying Moench/Kuper construct, plaintiffs' prudence claims
fail as a matter of law because Duke Energy was "a viable, strong company
with substantial assets . . . far from impending collapse and not in dire

circumstances").
282. Many courts

have

applied

the

"impending

collapse"/imminent

bankruptcy standard. See, e.g., Moench, 62 F.3d at 572 ("impending collapse");
Howell, 633 F.3d at 569 (affirming summary judgment on claim that
fiduciaries breached their duties by offering Motorola stock without evidence
of imminent collapse); Summers, 453 F.3d at 408-11 (affirming motion to
dismiss on claim that fiduciary imprudently failed to divest employer stock
when share price dropped precipitously and CEO warned that company was at
risk for bankruptcy); Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1460 (finding that presumption was
not overcome despite eighty percent decline in stock value, mounting debt, a
major plant fire halting production, and the CEO's sale of all of his company
stock holdings); Brieger, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (ruling that plan required the
offering of employer stock fund but declining to decide applicability of
prudence presumption because plaintiffs' claims failed under any standard;
stock was a sound investment, despite drop in price from $63 to $6.48 over
class period).
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circumstances that would suggest an abuse of discretion by
fiduciaries in deeming the company stock an appropriate longterm investment for the plan.283 A complaint "should allege facts,
not mere conclusions, to demonstrate that the circumstances . . .
were such that it was an abuse of discretion for the plan
fiduciaries to follow the [plan's] directions and allow company
contributions to be made in the form of company stock." 284
Other courts have permitted lawsuits to proceed in spite of
the ESOP presumption because "presumptions are evidentiary
standards that should not be applied to motions to dismiss." 285 In
its survey of the presumption, a district court noted, however, that
some courts have in fact used the ESOP presumption to grant
motions to dismiss, but found that there was "ample authority to
the contrary." 286
Most of the employer stock cases are not yet at the point
where the merits have been analyzed by the courts. Therefore, it is
difficult to determine whether future courts will follow or
distinguish the earlier stock drop cases described above, especially
because more recent cases have expanded the earlier stock drop
cases by applying the ESOP exception.
For example, in In re Duke Energy ERISA Litigation, the
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim and determined that the fiduciaries' decision to remain
invested in the employer's stock after a press release detailed
questionable "round trip" energy trades was reasonable. 287 The
court applied the presumption to the investment of matching
contribution in company stock and permitting employees to direct
the investment of employee contributions in company stock. 288 The
court cited earlier employer stock cases, which stated that a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty in the circumstances of continued
investment of an ESOP in company stock was a "narrow
exception." "Decreasing stock prices, such as the 80% drop in value
in Kuper, did not meet this narrow exception, whereas a
'precipitous decline' in stock price, 'combined with evidence that
the ESOP fiduciaries knew the sponsoring company was being
seriously mismanaged and facing impending collapse might."'289
The Duke court held:
283. EIAP investments in employer stock must be scrutinized for their
suitability over the long term. Wright, 360 F.3d at 1099 (recognizing that
beneficial effects of corporate actions "could likewise be generated years into
the future").
284. McKesson, 2002 WL 31431588, at *5.
285. Xcel, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
286. Sprint, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
287. See Duke, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 795 (granting defendants' motion to
dismiss).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 793.
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Nowhere do Plaintiffs explain why Duke Energy stock was 'unduly
risky' . . . . Plaintiffs also make vague allegations of 'lack of internal

controls' and some 'underreporting of profits,' but nowhere do
Plaintiffs allege that Duke Energy was anything other than a
viable, strong company with substantial assets. In fact, the
materials Plaintiffs incorporate into their Complaint or upon which
this court can take judicial notice demonstrate that Duke Energy is
a solid, viable company, far from 'impending collapse,' and not in
'dire circumstances.' Under the circumstances, the court must hold
290
that Plaintiffs' 'prudence claim' fails as a matter of law.

In Crowley v. Corning, Inc.,291 the court dismissed claims

against the administrative committee because the plaintiffs "made
only conclusory allegations insufficient to show that following the
ESOP portions of the Plan was imprudent under the
circumstances." 292 Distinguishing Stein v. Smith, 293 the Crowley
court stated that plaintiffs did not allege that "Corning had any
problems that could subject it to collapse, let alone that any
fiduciary knew, or should have known, of such problems." 294
In Wright v. Oregon Metallurgical Corporation, the court
granted plan-administrator defendants' motion to dismiss the
breach of fiduciary duty claim related to continued investment of
ESOP in employer stock.295 Applying the presumption of prudence,
the court held that fluctuations in the stock price absent "unusual
circumstances" are not enough to rebut the reasonableness
presumption. 296 The financial information revealed that the stock
was at all times a viable concern that continued to pay dividends
to investors even though it did not meet analysts' expectations.
Various economic factors affected its stock prices, including
depressed stainless steel prices and weaker demand for its
products. The stock was not in such dire circumstances that
defendants' decision to hold it in compliance with the plan's
requirement could have given rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. 297
In LaLonde v. Textron, Inc., the district court, citing the
Moench line of cases, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss

290. Id. at 794-95.
291. Corning, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
292. Id. at 230. "In order to plead such a claim, however, it is fitting to
require plaintiffs to allege underlying facts that demonstrate that the
fiduciaries abused their discretion in continuing to hold such a high
percentage of company stock." McKesson, 2002 WL 31431588, at *6.
293. Stein, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 166.
294. Corning, 2004 WL 763873, at *9.
295. Wright, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.
296. Id. at 1229.
297. Id. at 1234.
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the breach of fiduciary duty claim. 298 However, the First Circuit
vacated this decision 299 and criticized the district court for setting
a "hard-and-fast rule" in the standard it applied to the
presumption.300 Rather, the First Circuit noted that:
Because the important and complex issue of law implicated by
plaintiffs' claim is neither mature nor uniform, we believe that we
would run a very high risk of error were we to lay down a hard-andfast rule (or to endorse the district court's rule) based only on the
statute's text and history, the sparse pleadings, and the few
discordant judicial decisions discussing the issue we face.30
The court also stated that the district court failed to consider
plaintiffs' allegations that Textron artificially inflated its stock
price by concealing business problems, which were the later
subject of federal securities lawsuits. 302
V. TEEING UP THE ISSUE IN ERISA STOCK DROP CASES FOR THE
SUPREME COURT
There is significant chaos in the courts with respect to the
presumption of prudence. It is true that:
[Courts] do not pick our rules of law full-blossomed from the trees.
Every judge consulting his own experience must be conscious of
times when a free exercise of will, directed of set purpose to the
furtherance of the common good, determined the form and tendency
of a rule which at that moment took its origin in one creative act.303
Although the Pension Protection Act attempted to provide a
legislative fix to the problem of investment in employer stock, it
does not appear to have completely remedied all employer stock
issues. It is therefore time for the issue on the presumption of
prudence to be settled by the Supreme Court. As noted earlier, six
circuit courts have adopted the Moench presumption. However,
there is still much disagreement as to when it applies and what it
entails. The first issue is to determine to which stage the
presumption applies. Does it apply at the motion to dismiss stage
or is it an evidentiary standard to apply at the summary judgment
stage? Further, there is disagreement with regard to what is
required to rebut or overcome the presumption. Courts all over the
country are espousing divergent views on these issues.

298. LaLonde, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
299. LaLonde, 369 F.3d at 6.
300. Id. at 6.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, A.L. SAINER, AND ROBERT F. WAGNER,
LAW IS JUSTICE: NOTABLE OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO 428 (The
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ed., 1999).
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Issues involved in the fifty six Supreme Court ERISA
decisions have included ERISA preemption, application of the
abuse. of discretion standard afforded to fiduciaries who have
discretion over the plan, and the prudent person standard,
although not in the context of plan investments. None of the cases
have involved the interpretation of the ERISA prudence section in
connection with plan investments and what standard should
apply.
The Presumptionof Prudence Should Apply and at the
PleadingStage
In the latest round of circuit court holdings regarding the
application of the Moench presumption, the hat tips in favor of
defendants. 304 Recent victories for defendants have taken place in
the Second and Eleventh Circuits. 305 However, there are circuits
that have not formally adopted the presumption and there is a
clear conflict with the Sixth Circuit about the stage to which the
presumption applies.
A.

1. FiduciariesAre Entitled to Deference Under Firestone
Plaintiffs have argued that the Moench presumption has no
statutory basis in ERISA.306 However, the Supreme Court has
interpreted ERISA and granted fiduciaries deference in benefit
determination cases, beginning with Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Bruch.3 07 Firestone states that fiduciary deference not only
applies to benefit cases, but also to cases where fiduciaries have
discretion "to construe the terms of the plan." 308 While these cases
do not involve the investments of pension plan assets, let alone the
ability to invest in the employer's common stock via a defined
contribution plan specifically, the language in Firestone should
nevertheless apply to plan fiduciaries investing in employer stock.
Under Firestone, a de novo standard applies "unless the
benefit plan gives the fiduciary discretionary authority to construe
the terms of the plan," in which case the standard of review is for
abuse of discretion.30 This deferential treatment has subsequently
been upheld by the Supreme Court in Conkright v. Frommert.1o

304. Lanfear, 2012 WL 1580614 (11th Cir. 2012).
305. Citigroup,662 F.3d at 137.
306. Herman v. Nationsbank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1371 (11th Cir.
1997) (stating that following an ESOP plan provision regarding tendering
shares should not be reviewed for merely abuse of discretion).
307. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.

308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1660 (2010) (instructing the
district court to apply a deferential standard of review to the plan
administrator's interpretation of the plan on remand).
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The Supreme Court has explained the ERISA considerations and
concerns for an abuse of discretion standard:
Congress enacted ERISA to ensure that employees would receive
the benefits they had earned, but Congress did not require
employers to establish benefit plans in the first place. We have
therefore recognized that ERISA represents a "'careful balancing'
between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under the
plan and the encouragement of the creation of such plans." Congress
sought to "create a system that is [not] so complex that
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage
employers from offering [ERISA] plans in the first place." ERISA
"induc[es] employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable set
of liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a
uniform regime of ultimate remedial orders and awards when a
violation has occurred."31
This, along with ERISA's exception from diversification of
employer stock and the case law adopting it, supports the
presumption of prudence. 312 Accordingly, the presumption should
be applied.
Presumptions have long been relied upon in other areas of
law. They are created out of "considerations of fairness, public
policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy."3 13 One of the
most common presumptions is the business judgment rule, which
provides that courts "will not interfere with internal management
and substitute its judgment for that of D & Os to enjoin or set
aside the transaction or to surcharge the D & Os for any resulting
loss." 314 The test is met when "there is no showing of bad faith,
313
negligence, or gross abuse of discretion."
Even the dissent in Citigroup believed that a deferential
standard should apply in the corporate context, just not to ERISA
plan fiduciaries. 316 However, the dissent in that case did not delve
into the ERISA policy considerations that the Supreme Court has
established as mentioned above. Thus, the presumption of
prudence should be adopted by the Supreme Court.

2. Plausibility- The Heightened PleadingStandard
Once it is established that the presumption should apply, it
then becomes necessary to determine the stage in the litigation to

Id. at 1648-1649.
Quan, 623 F.3d at 882.
Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-247 (1988).
314. HARRY G. HENN AND JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS
661 (West Publishing, 3d ed. 1983).
311.
312.
313.

315. Id. at 663.
316.

Citigroup, 662 F.3d at 149-50.
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which the presumption applies. In Pfeil v. State Street3 17 the Sixth
Circuit clearly pronounced the distinction between its standard
and that of the Second Circuit's as set forth in Citigroup.318 The
Pfeil court held that the Moench presumption is an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement.
By contrast, the Citigroup court stated that the "presumption
is not an evidentiary presumption; it is a standard of review
applied to the decision made by an ERISA fiduciary." This is the
same approach also taken by the Third 319 and Eleventh Circuits. 320
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that it adopted the Moench
presumption in so far as fiduciaries of ESOPs or EIAPs with
employer stock operate under two hats and therefore should be
granted an abuse of discretion standard of review. 321 That
presumption, however, does not apply at the pleading stage. The
court recognized "that many district courts in this Circuit have
confronted the issue and reached conflicting decisions." 322 Notably,
the Kuper court espoused the presumption as an "evidentiary
presumption, and not a pleading requirement," 323 as it was decided
on a fully developed evidentiary record. It further citied the
Supreme Court case Swierkiewicz u. Sorema.324
However, all of the cases cited by the Sixth Circuit were
decided prior to adoption of the pleading requirements espoused in
Twombly and Iqbal. Sorema, for example, required only that the
plaintiff give the defendant some notice of the plaintiffs claims
and the grounds for it.325 In support of its holding, the Supreme
Court relied on the liberal pleading standard articulated in Conley
v. Gibson. Under Conley, a motion to dismiss would be granted
317. Pfeil, 671 F.3d at 591-95.
318. Citigroup, 662 F.3d at 139 ("Where plaintiffs do not allege facts
sufficient to establish that a plan fiduciary has abused his discretion, there is
no reason not to grant a motion to dismiss.").
319. Edgar, 503 F.3d at 349 (holding that the Moench presumption applies
at the motion to dismiss stage because there is "no reason to allow [the] case to
proceed to discovery when, even if the allegations [were] proven true, [the
plaintiff could not] establish that the defendants abused their discretion.").
320. Lanfear, 2012 WL 1580614, at *10 (applying the Moench presumption
at the motion to dismiss stage).
321. Pfiel, 671 F.3d at 597
322. Id. (noting that "[a]t least fourteen district courts in this Circuit have
addressed this issue. . ." and have "overwhelmingly declined to apply the
presumption of prudence" when considering a motion to dismiss);
Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 757 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758-59 (S.D. Ohio
2010) (holding that the Moench presumption applied at the pleadings stage in
light of Twombly and Iqbal).
323. Pfiel, 671 F.3d at 599.
324. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (holding that a
plaintiff was not required to plead all the prima facie elements of the
McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework in order to survive a motion to
dismiss).
325. Id.
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only if the plaintiff fails to prove facts supporting the claim
entitling the plaintiff to relief.326 But, keeping with the theme of
this Article, the Conley standard of pleading has since been put
into "retirement" by the Supreme Court in Twombly.3 27
On the other hand, the Second Circuit in Citigroup found that
"the presumption is not an evidentiary presumption; it is a
standard of review applied to the decision made by an ERISA
fiduciary." 328 The court followed the plausibility standard set forth
in Twombly and Iqbal: the complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is
plausible. 329 Even the Seventh Circuit, which has not formally
adopted the presumption, has recognized that under Twombly,
more is required than just labels and conclusions. Specifically, the
court stated "[a] conclusory statement that all defendants should
have known specific facts about a company is generally insufficient
to state a claim; it must be alleged that each defendant was in a
position to know or learn of the information." 330
As discussed previously, the Moench presumption is to plan
fiduciaries what the business judgment rule is to D & Os, and
Delaware Courts have required that the plaintiffs overcome the
business judgment rule at the motion to dismiss stage.33 1 While
the Federal Courts were slow to follow, 332 they now apply the
business judgment rule at the motion to dismiss stage as well. 333
Thus, the Moench presumption for plan fiduciaries should also
apply at the motion to dismiss stage.

326. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
327. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
328. Citigroup,662 F.3d at 129.
329. Id. at 141; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57 (holding that plaintiffs must
allege facts sufficient to suggest their claims are plausible as against other
theories explaining the alleged conduct); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009) (stating that Twombly's heightened pleading standard applies to all
claims pled under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
330. Pugh, 521 F.3d at 695.
331. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. v. S'holder Litig., 906 A.2d 808, 824 (Del. Ch.
2005).
332. Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Bayle, 2005 WL 2455673, at *16 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(applying business judgment rule at motion to dismiss stage).
333. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 374 B.R. 36, 48-49 (2007) ("In asserting
breach of fiduciary duty claims, it should have been obvious ... that the
business judgment rule would be implicated. For that reason, the [plaintiff]
was required to plead that he can overcome the presumption created by the
business judgment rule in order to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6)."); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 929 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(acknowledging that the Supreme Court "has now embraced the pleading
principle that Delaware courts have long applied.. ."); Dixon v. ATI Ladish
LLC, 667 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 2012).
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B. The Proper Standardfor Rebutting the Presumption

Plaintiffs need not necessarily prove that a company is "on
the brink of bankruptcy" in order to rebut the fiduciary
presumption, but they must demonstrate more than possible fraud
or corporate wrongdoing. 334 "Mere fluctuations, even those that
trend downward significantly, [were] insufficient to establish the
requisite imprudence to rebut the Moench presumption." 335
Courts have focused on developing the proper method for
plaintiffs to rebut the Moench presumption in order to preserve
the true purpose of ERISA. Indeed, the Second Circuit recently
explained in Citigroup that an overreaching irrefutable
presumption, "would leave employees' retirement savings that are
invested in [employer stock] without any protection at all - a
result that Congress sought to avoid in enacting ERISA."336
Accordingly, courts allow plaintiffs to rebut the presumption by
showing that it was an "abuse of discretion" to allow continued
investment in employer stock while the employer was in "a 'dire
situation' that was objectively unforeseeable by the settlor," and
that the fiduciary "knew or should have known" about the dire
situation.337

In deciphering when a fiduciary has an affirmative obligation
to override the EIAP or ESOP plan terms, the Moench court held
that this responsibility exists where "owing to circumstances not
known to the [plan] settlor and not anticipated by him,
maintaining the investment in company stock would defeat or
substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the
[plan]." 338 In applying this standard, the Citigroup court held that
it would not be pragmatic for settlor administrators to intend for
fiduciaries to divest the plan of EIAP or ESOP investments at the
first sign of trouble, but rather only in cases where the situation is
"dire."339 In cases where reasonable fiduciaries may disagree
regarding overriding a plan's EIAP or ESOP investment mandate,
the court affirmed that fiduciaries should be presumptively
shielded and only responsible in the most "dire" of situations.34 0
The Citigroup court explained that, in order to rebut the
presumption of reasonableness, the plaintiff might not necessarily
have pled the company's impending collapse, but must allege a
dire situation. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege
facts "sufficient to show that the defendants either know or should
have known that Citigroup was in the sort of dire situation that
334. Edgar, 503 F.3d at 348-49.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id. at 349.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Moench, 62 F.3d at 568.
Citigroup, 662 F.3d at 140.
Id.
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required them to override Plan terms in order to limit participants'
investments in Citigroup stock."341 The court further added that
even if the fiduciaries had investigated the company's exposure to
the subprime mortgage market, the dire situation the company
was in was not foreseeable.3 42
The Sixth Circuit clearly stated that it was not adopting a
rebuttal presumption requiring a dire situation or that the
company be on the brink of collapse. "The rebuttal standard
adopted in this Circuit, and one which we are bound to follow,
requires a plaintiff to prove that 'a prudent fiduciary acting under
similar circumstances would have made a different investment
decision."' 343 The court reasoned that this sets out an abuse of
discretion standard forcing plaintiffs to carry a demanding burden,
while at the same time providing the "flexibility to address the
unique circumstances that might give rise to a breach-of-duty
claim against an ESOP fiduciary, whether the company is one
with small capitalization or a corporation 'too big to fail."'3 4 4 The
court concluded that "the better course is to permit the lower
courts to consider the presumption in the context of a fuller
evidentiary record rather than just the pleadings and their
exhibits. 345 The Sixth Circuit stands alone on this issue, that the
proper rebuttable standard that of a dire situation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, while the MPT is still considered a viable
investment theory, it may require some tweaking to account for
the current economic environment. Although no particular
investment theory may be considered better than another, plan
fiduciaries should at least consider some type of investment theory
in viewing the plan's investment portfolio and how employer
securities add value to the mix.

341. Id. at 141. An example of a dire situation can be found in Peabody v.
Davis, where the court held that "a widely known and permanent change in
the regulatory environment had undermined [the company's] core business
model," and accordingly, investing in the company's stock became imprudent.
Peabody v. Davis, 636 F.3d 368, 375 (7th Cir. 2011). The idea that a
"regulatory" change could eviscerate a company's stated business model and
purpose was central to the Seventh Circuit's holding that this was a "dire"
situation. Id. In declining to address the applicability of the Moench
presumption, the Peabody court stressed that the SEC's decimalization rule
was so devastating to the defendant company's profit margins from 2001 to
2003 that no prudent fiduciary could continue an investment in this stock
during that time. Id. From 2001 to 2003 the company's profit margin had
declined by approximately 70-80%. Id.
342. Id.
343. Pfiel, 671 F.3d at 599.
344. Id.

345. Id. at 600.
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In connection with litigation, the ERISA employer stock cases
have grappled with the apparent conflict in the use of the Moench
presumption at the motion to dismiss stage as well as whether
plaintiffs must plead an "impending collapse" of the company to
overcome the presumption. Courts should apply the presumption
at the motion to dismiss stage as well as require plaintiffs to show
"impending collapse" to overcome the Moench presumption. While
questions as to the application of the Moench presumption to EIAP
plans have not been solidified, the issues of investment choice and
company information available to the employees, as well as
whether company investment is mandated under the plan are
strong considerations. However, what is clear is that the courts
need to review the fiduciary's duties and the "dire circumstances"
based on the information available at the time of the alleged
breach, not on hindsight. Accordingly, having this uniform
standard of prudence applied early in the litigation would
certainly filter out meritless cases, resulting in freeing plan
fiduciaries and D & Os from needless litigation and loosening
courts' dockets.
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